The Perils of Primacy: Successor Liability for Lenders Turned Declarants in Louisiana Common Interest Communities by Odinet, Christopher K.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 74 | Number 3
Spring 2014
The Perils of Primacy: Successor Liability for
Lenders Turned Declarants in Louisiana Common
Interest Communities
Christopher K. Odinet
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Christopher K. Odinet, The Perils of Primacy: Successor Liability for Lenders Turned Declarants in Louisiana Common Interest
Communities, 74 La. L. Rev. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol74/iss3/8
 
 
The Perils of Primacy: Successor Liability for Lenders 
Turned Declarants in Louisiana Common Interest 
Communities 
Christopher K. Odinet∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Introduction ............................................................................. 778 
I. Declarations and Real Estate .................................................. 784 
 A. Micro-governments ........................................................... 785 
 B. Declarations and Power .................................................... 788 
 C. Lending and Control ......................................................... 791 
II. Collateralizing Control ............................................................ 797 
 A. Under Mortgage Law—Immovable Aspects of CCRs .... 797 
 B. Under UCC Article 9—Movable Aspects of CCRs ........ 804 
 C. Under the Law of Pledge—Gap Filling ........................... 808 
III. Successor Declarants and Liability in Louisiana ................... 812 
 A. Under Assignment and Assumption Principles ............... 813 
 B. Under Servitudes and Building Restrictions .................... 818 
 C. Under Corporate Law Theories ........................................ 822 
IV. Fairness and Flexibility: Critiques and a Proposed 
 Solution .................................................................................... 825 
 A. A Critique of State Doctrinal Possibilities ....................... 825 
 B. The Community Regime Approach ................................. 827 
 1. Deficiencies in Current Statutory Frameworks ......... 827 
 2. The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act ........ 829 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET. 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center. B.A., 
Louisiana State University A. & M. 2007; J.D./G.D.C.L., Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center, Louisiana State University. The author thanks the editors of the Louisiana 
Law Review for their gracious invitation to participate in this Louisiana-themed issue, 
as well as Michael Rubin, James Stuckey, David Cromwell, Randy Roussel, and 
Professors Missy Lonegrass, Randy Trahan, Andi Carroll, John Lovett, and Dian 
Tooley-Knoblett for their invaluable comments and advice. Lastly, the author thanks 
Chancellor Pitcher of the Southern University Law Center for his continued support 
of faculty scholarship. The views and conclusions contained herein and any errors are 
the author’s alone. 
778 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
  a. Liability for Original Declarants Under 
   the UCIOA ............................................................ 831 
 b. Liability for Successor Declarants Under 
  the UCIOA ............................................................ 832 
 3. A Call for Reform ....................................................... 834 
 Conclusion ............................................................................... 835 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In surveying the landscape of American real estate, it is 
increasingly difficult—if not impossible—to find a development or 
community that is not part of or subject to a larger, comprehensive, and 
common-interest plan.1 Whether one is strolling through the avenues of 
a mixed-use development after finishing dinner and a long day of 
shopping or driving down the manicured, tree-lined streets past rows of 
uniform, wrought-iron mailboxes in a residential neighborhood, careful 
planning and coordination went into making these developments 
possible.2 And this careful planning and coordination were not merely 
the result of one-time efforts; rather, a complex and detailed legal 
regime underpins the entire development to ensure that the order, 
quality, and aesthetic of the project continue into the future.3 
These types of developments, which have come to dominate nearly 
all real estate development in the United States, are known as 
“common interest communities.”4 The idea behind the common 
interest community concept is to create developments whereby the 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Patrick K. Hetrick, Drafting Common Interest Community Documents: 
Minimalism in an Era of Micromanagement, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 409 (2008); 
Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities or Public Governments: 
“The State Will Make the Call”, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 509, 521 (1996); David J. 
Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated 
Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 763 (1995). 
 2. See Katharine Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State 
Constitutions to Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 20 (1984); James W. Torke, What Price Belonging: An Essay 
on Groups, Community, and the Constitution, 24 IND. L. REV. 1 (1990); ROBERT JAY 
DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 62 (1992). 
 3. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE 
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 140 (1994); Gregory S. Alexander, 
Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1989); Frank Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A 
Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581 (1982). 
 4. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and 
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 305 (1998). 
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owners or occupants share common responsibilities with regard to the 
upkeep, maintenance, and expenses of the development as a whole.5 
Moreover, these developments are typically structured so as to ensure 
that a certain level of beauty, quality, and visual appeal is maintained 
even after the developer no longer owns any part of the community.6 
Governance of the community is assumed by an association, the board 
of which is made up of the elected owners of the lots or units within 
the development.7 And, with the ability to charge each owner an annual 
assessment, the association is able to maintain funds for the repair, 
replacement, and enhancement of the community over time.8 The 
common interest community framework is seen in almost all forms of 
property-related projects, including condominium complexes, housing 
developments, vacation timeshares, and many mixed-use projects.9 
Through this framework, the various owners/occupants of the 
development can enjoy amenities—such as a community park, tennis 
court, or swimming pool—that would otherwise be too expensive for 
any individual owner/occupant to afford on his or her own.10 
The first common interest communities came into existence around 
the period from 1910 to 1935 in the form of simple homeowners’ 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of 
Community Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 589, 698 (1993); Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal 
Services: A Contagion in the Body Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 57 (1995). 
 6. See Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass’n, 779 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding in favor of a restrictive covenant because the court thought that “the 
public policy the Uniform Condominium Act [is] in favor of the social benefits of 
planned community developments”); Justin D. Cummins, Recasting Fair Share: 
Toward Effective Housing Law and Principled Social Policy, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 339, 
347–48 (1996) (showing that community associations can stabilize and mobilize 
social resources for advancement, but people in low-income, central-city 
communities are socially isolated from the community association); William C. 
Jensen & Cynthia L. McNeill, Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act—How It Is 
Doing, 25 COLO. LAW. 17, 17–18 (1996) (showing that the unit owner’s association is 
responsible for the “social cohesiveness of its owners”). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.16 (2000); see also 
Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step, 37 
URB. LAW. 359, 362 (2005). 
 8. See Paula Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest 
Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice”, 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005). 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6, introductory cmt. 
(2000); see also Hyatt, supra note 4. 
 10. See Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, 
Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 204 (1992); Government by the Nice, for the Nice, 
ECONOMIST, July 25, 1992, at 25; see also SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, 
SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS AMERICA 153–73 (2003). 
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associations.11 In these early common interest communities, the 
various owners within a development, desiring to obtain large-scale 
common amenities, pooled together resources to erect and maintain 
these desired facilities and services.12 Since then, the complexity of 
common interest communities has grown tremendously, particularly 
through the increasing emergence of mixed-use developments.13 
Moreover, the associations that govern and maintain common interest 
communities have become involved in spheres beyond the mere 
physical or traditional boundaries of the development as they seek 
more and more to influence political decision-making at the local level, 
coordinate social activities for development occupants, and even 
undertake the privatization of certain public or municipal services.14 
For example, the Reston Town Center common interest community 
in Virginia is composed of three separate sub-common interest 
communities: one for each of the industrial, business, and residential 
portions of the development.15 The business and the industrial centers 
are governed by their own non-profit associations, while the 
association that governs the residential portion is further divided into 
more sub-associations that cover cluster areas within the larger 
residential area.16 In order to coordinate all of these various 
developments, functions, and expenses, a joint association committee 
was established to manage the entire Reston Town Center community.17 
This overseeing association manages everything from the 
development’s coordinated transportation system to events and 
programs that support the arts and cultural aspects of the community.18 
In essence, common interest communities have become major 
undertakings that take on many of the functions of government and tie 
                                                                                                             
 11. See MARC A. WEISS & JOHN W. WATTS, COMMUNITY BUILDERS AND 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: THE ROLE OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS IN PRIVATE 
RESIDENTIAL GOVERNANCE, in U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 97–99 (1989), available at http://www 
.globalurban.org/Community_Builders_and_Community_Associations.pdf [http: 
//perma.cc/4Z6E-N9XT] (archived Mar. 10, 2014). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Hyatt, supra note 4, at 321; Robert G. Natelson, Condominiums, Reform, 
and the Unit Ownership Act, 58 MONT. L. REV. 495, 500–01 (1997). 
 14. See Hyatt, supra note 4; JAMES HOWARD KUNTSLER, HOME FROM 
NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY WORLD FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1996). 
 15. See Hyatt, supra note 4, at 321. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 322. 
 18. Id. 
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together the interests of various private parties in order to achieve a 
larger, dynamic goal.19 
But, as might be imagined, these complex and highly sophisticated 
developments do not come for free.20 Real estate lending, which has 
for most of its history been tied to more traditional types of residential 
or commercial developments, has had to morph and evolve to fit the 
needs of the ambitious developers of these complex, common interest 
communities.21 On the one hand, these types of developments—
particularly the more complex and multi-tiered ones—carry with them 
a great deal of risk because so much capital must be incorporated on 
the front end to construct the various common facilities and amenities 
that make the development economically viable.22 But on the other 
hand, the payoff from the creation of a unique and highly marketable 
development that can assure continued quality, aesthetic, and financial 
self-sufficiency can be substantial.23  
And like all lenders, a primary concern in assessing whether a loan 
for a common interest community has merit involves assessing what 
type of collateral is available to secure the debt.24 Traditional types of 
collateral, such as the real estate underlying the project, the buildings 
and improvements to be erected on that land, as well as the equipment, 
materials, accounts, and various other assets of the borrower all serve 
                                                                                                             
 19. Id. See also Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization, 
Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553 
(2002); Paula A. Franzese, Building Community in Common Interest Communities: 
The Promise of the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
17, 19 (2003). 
 20. See generally David L. Callies, Common Interest Communities: An 
Introduction, 37 URB. LAW. 325 (2005); Julia Patterson Forrester & Jerome Michael 
Organ, Promising to Be Prudent: A Private Law Approach to Mortgage Loan 
Regulation in Common interest communities, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 739 (2012). 
 21. See generally GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, 
AND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2009). 
 22. See Jenny Schuetz et al., Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage 
Foreclosures 2 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 08-41, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270121; G. THOMAS 
KINGSLEY ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 
13–21 (2009); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 
at xv (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y7GY-CEG7] (archived Mar. 10, 2014); Stewart E. Sterk, 
Neponsit Property Owners’ Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, in 
PROPERTY STORIES 301, 308 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004). 
 23. See MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 35; NELSON ET AL., supra note 21. 
 24. See generally Dean P. Wyman, May I Have My Balance Please? Allocation 
of Payments in Bankruptcy Cases, 100 COM. L.J. 132 (1995); OLIVER R. SIMS & 
FRANKLIN B. FIELDS, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LENDING: RISK MITIGATION AND 
BANK SUPERVISION (2013). 
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as the backbone to any real estate financing.25 However, common 
interest communities provide an additional and very unique type of 
asset—the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“the 
declaration” or the “CCRs”).26 This document lays out the legal regime 
that gives teeth and effects to the common interest community by 
ensuring that each owner is responsible for sharing in the costs of the 
community and that the quality and visual appeal of the development 
can be legally maintained.27 For a significant period during the early 
part of the development’s life, it is the developer who exercises the 
powers under the declaration and thereby is able to control and govern 
the development to ensure his or her vision is upheld.28 
Importantly, these declarations serve as an ample form of collateral 
to guarantee that the lender, upon foreclosure, is able to continue to 
ensure that the asset maintains its quality and value until a third-party 
buyer can be procured.29 As such, many lenders have come to require 
that the developer grant a security interest in the CCRs to secure the 
debt.30 By doing so, the lender obtains a powerful tool that can help 
safeguard the property’s value if a default and subsequent foreclosure 
occurs.31 However, when developers default on real estate loans, it is 
typically preceded by other financial woes and troubles.32 And 
specifically, often times when a default occurs, many of the duties that 
the developer owed to the owners under the declaration have either 
gone unfulfilled or were breached due to lack of diligence or even 
malfeasance on the part of the distressed developer.33 
For example, Developer A obtains a loan from Realty Bank to 
construct a mixed-use development called Bluebell Lane, for which the 
bank takes a mortgage on the entire property. A comprehensive and 
complex declaration of CCRs is placed on the entire development in 
order to ensure that Developer A’s vision of a high-quality, 
aesthetically pleasing, and well-organized development—which will 
be comprised of offices, retail spaces, restaurants, shopping, and 
residential areas—will be created and maintained. In that vein, Realty 
Bank obtains a security interest in the CCRs as well. 
                                                                                                             
 25. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A 
SYSTEMS APPROACH (7th ed. 2008); NELSON ET AL., supra note 21. 
 26. See infra Part I.A–C and accompanying discussion. 
 27. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 28. See infra Part I.A–C; see also PATRICK H. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, 
COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9.01, 9.02 (2001). 
 29. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 30. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 31. See infra Part I.A–C. 
 32. See Forrester & Organ, supra note 20. 
 33. See infra Parts III, IV. 
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Among other things, the declaration requires Developer A to erect 
a community pool and recreation center on the rooftop of the third 
floor of one of the buildings in the development. After building most of 
Bluebell Lane and selling or leasing out various portions of the 
development, it is discovered that the pool is leaking and has caused 
damage to the occupants of the lower floors of the building. Further, 
this has resulted in the various disgruntled residents having no place to 
swim or engage in community recreational activities. Shortly 
thereafter, there are accusations that Developer A has not properly 
accounted for the assessments paid to him under the declaration by the 
various owners. These travails ultimately culminate in the developer’s 
default on the loan due to Realty Bank. 
After failed negotiations, Realty Bank forecloses on Bluebell Lane 
and obtains ownership of the portions of the development that are still 
owned by Developer A and subject to the bank’s mortgage at the time 
of the default. Also, Realty Bank forecloses on its security rights in the 
declaration and thereby steps into the developer’s shoes as the new 
declarant. But after the foreclosure, the aggrieved owners are still 
seeking recourse for the developer’s failure to construct the required 
improvements, as well as the property damage caused by the leaking 
pool and for the allegations of mismanagement of the community’s 
common funds. All of these alleged breaches were made by the 
developer in and during his role as the declarant. Now that Realty Bank 
is the declarant, can the owners go against the bank for the developer’s 
past misdeeds? If so, is the bank liable for all or only some of these bad 
acts? Does the developer remain liable for some portion regardless? 
And is there a limit on this successor liability for the bank? The 
answers to these questions can produce substantial effects for both the 
bank and the developer, as well as for the ability of the owners to 
obtain justice. 
While many, if not all, of these questions have been addressed in 
the laws of most jurisdictions, Louisiana is not one of them.34 How 
would a Louisiana court address the successor liability of Realty Bank? 
This question, as well as the nuanced issues of how (and if) such 
complex animals as common interest community declarations can be 
collateralized under Louisiana’s security devices regime, has been 
given little to no treatment by commentators or the jurisprudence. To 
that end, this Article attempts to shed light on the complexities of 
common interest community declarations and the possibilities (as well 
as possible limitations) with regard to how they can be collateralized in 
Louisiana.35 Part I gives an overview of common interest communities 
and the CCR declarations that form such an integral part of their 
                                                                                                             
 34. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 35. See infra Part II.A–C. 
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substance, as well as discusses the various privileges, advantages, and 
powers that they confer on the developer and, by extension, a 
foreclosing lender.36 Part II explores the multifaceted nature of these 
types of legal instruments and analyzes how Louisiana’s various 
security devices interface with CCR collateral.37 Part III discusses the 
potential successor liability of lenders who foreclose on CCR 
declarations and considers how Louisiana courts might utilize various 
legal theories, doctrines, and related statutes to make the ultimate 
determination of successor liability.38 Finally, Part IV critiques the 
application of these theories, doctrines, and piecemeal statutory 
constructs under existing state law and, in the alternative, advocates for 
the legislative adoption of a comprehensive and uniform statutory 
framework for all types of common interest communities in Louisiana 
that will lay to rest, in a fair and equitable way, the question of 
successor liability for lenders turned declarants.39 
I. DECLARATIONS AND REAL ESTATE 
Because economic forces place great weight on the aesthetics and 
atmosphere of a community or project, developers are highly 
incentivized to ensure that their developments conform to standards of 
beauty, quality, and sophistication.40 These factors are directly 
connected to the development’s value, how people view the project, 
who chooses to live or work there, and even the level of safety and 
security that the area enjoys.41 Because of the intimate connection 
between the aesthetic and atmosphere of the place and its economic 
viability, developers often impose a comprehensive and complex set of 
rules and restrictions on the property to not only ensure that the 
development obtains the desired level of quality and beauty, but also 
that these conditions continue into the future. 
This objective is accomplished chiefly through various legal 
institutions contained in a wide-ranging legal document called a 
                                                                                                             
 36. See infra Part I. 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
 40. See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697 
(2010). 
 41. See JILL GRANT, PLANNING THE GOOD COMMUNITY: NEW URBANISM IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 58 (2005); see also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF 
GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 75 (1961); ANDRES DUANY & ELIZABETH PLATER-
ZYBERK, TOWNS AND TOWN-MAKING PRINCIPLES 9–11 (Alex Krieger & William 
Lennertz eds., 1991); ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF 
SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 80–81 (2000); George L. 
Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29. 
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“declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions.”42 However, 
developers are not the only parties to a real estate development who 
recognize the importance of the declaration and its effects. Banks and 
other lenders who help make the deal happen also desire to ensure that 
the project is well regulated and coordinated.43 Understanding how 
these declarations interface with the motivations of the lender are 
essential to understanding the long-term financing of many real estate 
developments across the country.44 
A. Micro-governments 
At the heart of every comprehensive property declaration is the 
desire to create a community whereby its inhabitants can exercise 
control over their given environment.45 Often times these take the form 
of homeowners’ associations whereby the individual owners of the 
parcels within the subdivision band together to create a form of local 
government to regulate and control the goings-on within that particular 
community.46 Other times this system of community control takes 
place in a large condominium complex where the various owners of 
the units pool resources and elect leaders to administer the functions of 
government.47 Still others involve a collection of commercial property 
owners within a given retail or office development who share in the 
responsibility of governing and maintaining their building or 
complex.48 The residents or occupants of these developments can range 
from as few as ten to much larger developments that can dwarf the size 
                                                                                                             
 42. See Wiseman, supra note 40, at 711–13. 
 43. See generally Daniel E. Feder, Should Loan-to-Value Ratio Restrictions Be 
Reimposed on National Banks’ Real Estate Lending Activities?, 6 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 341 (1987); Scott A. Lindquist, Real Estate Lending Regulations: The 
New Ball Game, 7 PROB. & PROP. 11 (1993). 
 44. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 21. 
 45. See Mark A. Rogers, Community Association Law: Administrative Law as a 
Solution by Analogy, 53 EMORY L.J. 1457 (2004). 
 46. See DILGER, supra note 2, at 5; see also James L. Winokur, Critical 
Assessment: The Financial Role of Community Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1135, 1138 (1998) (“In the largest United States metropolitan areas, a majority 
of all new housing sold is now in common interest communities.”); Rebecca J. 
Schwartz, Public Gated Residential Communities: The Rosemont, Illinois, Approach 
and Its Constitutional Implications, 29 URB. LAW. 123, 124–25 (1997) (“Long 
considered the domain of wealthy subdivisions on each coast, demand for gated 
communities . . . has increased dramatically since the early 1980s.”). 
 47. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 1, 3–4 (1989). 
 48. See generally id. 
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of many small towns and villages.49 And similar to local governments, 
they often stretch over a large geographic area.50 Further, these 
governing associations not only regulate and control the property 
within a given development, but they are also given direct ownership 
over certain portions of the development to hold in favor of the 
owners—such as a community park or garden space.51 
Further, much like municipal governments, associations will often 
provide various goods and services to the development such as 
ensuring the maintenance of roads and streets, as well as overseeing 
regular safety patrols.52 With many residential subdivisions, the 
services provided by the association can even include golf courses, 
swimming pools, and community centers.53 And to pay for these 
government-like functions, the association has a quasi-taxing power, 
which allows it to charge assessments against each of the parcels or 
units within the development.54 The pooling of these funds creates a 
common treasury from which monies can be drawn for both ordinary 
and extraordinary maintenance, repair, expenses, and special projects.55 
To those owners who refuse to pay, the association can place a 
property lien against their parcel and thereby cause issues of non-
merchantable title, violations of existing loan agreements, and a 
weakening of the parcel’s commercial viability.56 Moreover, not all 
associations are created equal.57 Some provide a higher or lower degree 
of quality and variety of services to their owners.58 It is through this 
menu of services that various developments obtain their identities.59 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1375, 1382 (1994). 
 50. See Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review 
and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 663 (2000). 
 51. See Wiseman, supra note 40. 
 52. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1382. 
 53. See N. Palm Beach Cnty. Water Control Dist. v. Florida, 604 So. 2d 440, 444 
(Fla. 1992) (“The onsite roadway improvements include paving of the roadways, the 
striping, the signage, landscaping with the roadways, irrigation to maintain the 
landscaping and sodding, bridges, an overpass, culverts, street lighting, security 
gatehouses, and secondary drainage system consisting of storm drainage pipes, inlets, 
manholes and surface drainage.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Westwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Lane County, 847 P.2d 862, 865 
(Or. Ct. App. 1993); Bd. of Dirs. of Olde Salem Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Sec’y of 
Veterans Affairs, 589 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Inwood North 
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 636–37 (Tex. 1987); see also 
Wiseman, supra note 40. 
 55. See Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 1, at 518. 
 56. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829 
(2004). 
 57. Gillette, supra note 49, at 1388–90. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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“Just as municipalities may distinguish themselves by offering superior 
schools, spacious parks, or proximity to workplaces, so may 
associations offer singular services such as security gateways, a golf 
course, or a ‘Caribbean Island’ motif.”60 For instance, Louisiana’s 
more upper-end residential developments typically provide a sort of 
French country chateau region-type feel with the maintenance of 
artificial lakes, fountains, tree-lined avenues, and brick sidewalks 
handled by the association.61 
Although the generally understood goal of community associations 
is to create and maintain the value of the development,62 various other, 
more nuanced purposes for these micro-governments have been 
expressed by property law scholars.63 As an initial matter, associations 
are formed to provide a certain service or fulfill a certain goal.64 Much 
like in the way local governments are valued for providing essential 
services to their citizenry, community associations are similarly desired 
due to their ability to provide certain services.65 Further, commentators 
note that the quality of services provided by a local government 
typically are not directly aligned with the geographical boundary of the 
municipality.66 Demand may be higher in one portion of the city, yet 
the services are diffused equally throughout.67 Nor does the municipal 
system of service provide specially allocated services to those who are 
most in need of them.68 Associations provide a type of solution to this 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. at 1383. 
 61. See, e.g., JR Ball, We’re the Face of Poverty: This Is the Tale of Our Two 
Baton Rouges, BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Nov. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.businessreport.com/article/20111114/BUSINESSREPORT0202/11111 
9897 [http://perma.cc/QPX6-3DPF] (archived Mar. 10, 2014) (“That’s because 
readers of this publication tend to be business executives, tend to be in an upper-
middle-income bracket or higher, tend to be white and tend to live in faux French 
Country homes, many along Highland Road and almost all well south of Florida 
Boulevard.”). 
 62. See Wiseman, supra note 40, at 699 (“The aesthetics and atmosphere of our 
neighborhoods and communities matter. In addition to their ability to raise or lower 
property values, they affect the ways we think and interact with each other, how our 
children play, how we choose to travel, and even crime rates.”). 
 63. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1388–1406 (discussing of the public goods 
versus the civil community models of associations). 
 64. Id. at 1388 (“For those who consider a primary value of local governments to 
be their capacity to provide local public goods efficiently, the ability of residential 
associations to achieve that same objective underlies much of their appeal.”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (citing An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty, 71 MICH. L. 
REV. 1376, 1426–27 (1973); ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 
METROPOLITAN ORGANIZATION: THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY CASE 86–88 (1992)). 
 67. See Gillette, supra note 49, 1387; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 135–45 (1962). 
 68. See Gillette, supra note 49, 1389–90 (“Localities are bound by legal 
obligations of equal service and “public purpose” spending that are imposed to 
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problem of distribution.69 Individuals who desire the same service or 
the same level and quality of a certain service can come together, pool 
resources, and create a system of private ordering that meets such 
specific goals.70 “Individuals who, for instance, desire more police 
service than the average resident of the municipality may find it easier 
to coalesce in a section of the municipality and hire private security 
forces rather than lobby for more police service citywide.”71 By 
engaging in this form of micro-governance, the distribution of public 
services is more closely aligned with the supply and demand for such 
services, as those who most utilize and desire the public goods are 
responsible for paying for the cost.72 
In that same vein, the rules and restrictions that are imposed by the 
association—through the declaration—create a sense of homogeneity 
and consistency throughout the development.73 And because of the 
intricate steps that are involved in changing the rules and restrictions of 
an association—as well as the way in which such covenants run with 
the land or units regardless of who is the owner—the CCRs create a 
system that prevents radical or sweeping changes in the nature and 
aesthetic of the development.74 
B. Declarations and Power 
Aside from its many effects and purposes, community associations 
draw their power and authority from the comprehensive property 
declaration.75 These typically rather large documents are comprised of 
a complex and detailed framework of servitudes and building 
                                                                                                             
 
prevent invidious discrimination within the municipality or to preclude discrete 
groups from lobbying successfully for unique benefits. As one result of these 
doctrines, even where the effects of public provision coincide with local boundaries, 
localities cannot readily respond to differential demand by residents. Residents within 
the locality who would prefer to trade one service for another are unable to do so.”); 
see also HENRY J. RAIMONDO, ECONOMICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 77–
79 (1992). 
 69. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1390. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1390–91. 
 72. See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 814–23 (1987); see also Todd Sandler 
& John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 18 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1481, 1482 (1980). 
 73. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 
907–09 (1988). 
 74. See Gillette, supra note 49, 1395–99. 
 75. See WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION 
PRACTICE: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION LAW 24 (3d ed. 2000). 
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restrictions that are imposed collectively upon the entirety of the 
property within the development (be it all the land in the subdivision or 
all of the units and common areas within a condominium complex or 
office building/park).76 Because the entire development is initially 
owned by the developer, the drafting of the declaration lies with his or 
her lawyers.77 The goal is to provide a comprehensive set of rules and 
frameworks that will govern the development from its beginning stages 
of construction, through its development, during its early years of 
operation, and into the future.78 As individual parcels or units are sold 
to third parties by the developer, the declaration’s effects stay with the 
land regardless of in whose hands the unit or property ultimately ends 
up.79 
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, for most of the early 
years of a development’s life, the association—through the careful 
drafting of the declaration—is controlled by the developer.80 The 
developer decides if and when the declaration will be amended or 
enforced and whether additional requirements or assessments may be 
imposed.81 Then, once a certain percentage of the overall units or 
parcels within the development are sold to third parties, control over 
the declaration will be transferred from the developer to the individual 
owners who will then elect the board of directors themselves.82 
The powers that are granted by the declaration can be quite 
extensive.83 “They typically purport to regulate such issues as 
                                                                                                             
 76. See Brian Jason Fleming, Regulation of Political Signs in Private 
Homeowner Associations: A New Approach, 59 VAND. L. REV. 571, 578–79 (2006). 
 77. See Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in 
Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 
41, 47 (1990). 
 78. See Callies, supra note 20, at 325–26 (“A major user of such real covenants 
is the property developer of large residential communities who wishes to guarantee a 
certain measure of uniformity (or difference) in the houses that make up its projected 
residential community.”). 
 79. See id. at 326. 
 80. See Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U 
PA. L. REV. 1589, 1592–96 (1982); see also Callies, supra note 20, at 326. 
 81. Natelson, supra note 77, at 47. 
 82. See Callies, supra note 20, at 326 (“Sometime following the selling of the 
last lot (or the construction of the last home if the developer is building them) the 
developer transfers the enforcement function to some sort of association of 
homeowners . . . .”); see also Wilbert Washington, II, A Model Homeowners 
Association Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, 23 No. 4 PRAC. 
REAL EST. LAW. 23, 29–32 (2007). 
 83. See Wiseman, supra note 40, at 711–13 (“The homeowners moving to these 
communities, if seeking only an affordable living space, are likely vaguely aware that 
general zoning regulations of the municipality apply but may be surprised by the 
detailed set of additional rules that they encounter. To create this community, a 
developer (sometimes unbeknownst to the buyer), first bargains with the city or 
county government that has jurisdiction over the land, providing infrastructure and 
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architectural design, fencing, use of structures, use of common areas, 
and the subdivision of lots.”84 Often times these restrictions are far 
more strict and limiting than those that are imposed by the local 
government.85 Such highly restrictive covenants include those that 
dictate the style of home, the color of exterior walls, the use of satellite 
televisions, the number of guests of an owner that may be present at 
any given time, the style of mailbox, and even the size and type of 
gardens and landscaping that are allowed.86 By creating such a 
restrictive regime, these CCRs create a system that reduces “both the 
search costs involved in finding like-minded individuals and the risk of 
regret that would be suffered should one discover, after making an 
expensive home purchase, that the neighborhood is less hospitable than 
originally assumed.”87 
That is not to say that the micro-governments created by these 
declarations always accomplish their goals.88 As stated above, typically 
the legal foundation of these heavy-handed limitations and restrictions 
                                                                                                             
 
other amenities in exchange for approval. The developer then obtains approval of a 
plat and subdivision plan and drafts the private rules for the community, most of 
which are contained within the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions, 
and then records the declaration prior to the sale of the first lot. The declaration is 
binding upon all current and future property owners as well as the property owners’ 
or homeowners’ association, which is the community’s governing body. 
Accompanying the covenants are the architectural or design review guidelines, which 
are also typically adopted by the developer and place additional restrictions on 
property use. Finally, bylaws are adopted by the association’s board of directors. 
These substantially affect residents’ rights, particularly by setting some of the 
procedures that the board must follow in modifying or enforcing rules. Combined, the 
architectural review guidelines, covenants, and bylaws form a complex set of 
limitations on individual uses of property and define the framework within which 
homeowners may influence those rules.”). 
 84. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1384–85. 
 85. See, e.g., Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass’n, 779 S.W.2d 603, 607–08 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
 86. See Linn Valley Lakes Property Owners Ass’n v. Brockway, 824 P.2d 948, 
949 (Kan. 1992); McGuire v. Bell, 761 S.W.2d. 904, 911 (Ark. 1988); Miller v. First 
Colony Cmty. Servs. Ass’n, No. 01-92-00132-CV, 1993 WL 331092, at *1 (Tex. 
App. Aug. 31, 1993); West Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138 N.E.2d 403, 404 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 S.2d 572, 573–74 (Fla. Dist. App. 
1992); Forest Glen Cmty. Homeowners Ass’n v. Nolan, 432 N.E.2d 636, 637–38 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1982); see also Robert D. Brussack, Group Homes, Families, and Meaning 
in the Law of Subdivision Covenants, 16 GA. L. REV. 33, 46–48 (1981). 
 87. Gillette, supra note 49, at 1395 (citing EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE 
EMERGENCE OF NORMS 104–09 (Oxford 1977)). 
 88. Brussack, supra note 86, at 34–40. See also Glen O. Robinson, Explaining 
Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546 
(1991); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward 
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. 
REV. 1, 7–16 (1989). 
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are based in the law of servitudes and building restrictions.89 However, 
because of the many affirmative obligations imposed upon the parties, 
as well as the many regulations that do not technically “touch and 
concern” the land, declarations can sometimes exceed what is legally 
permissible.90 These types of overreaching restrictions are particularly 
subject to attack due to the general public policy of keeping property in 
commerce and the more general property law directive that discourages 
unreasonable restrictions and restraints on real property.91 
Nevertheless, the use of declarations has been prolific across the 
United States, and it is almost impossible to find a real estate 
development—residential, commercial, industrial, or otherwise—that 
does not have a comprehensive set of covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions imposed upon it.92 
C. Lending and Control 
For all their merits and pitfalls, the types of developments 
discussed above would not be possible without the participation of 
many lenders and financers who share the developer’s desire to not 
only see the project become successful but also profitable.93 Real estate 
                                                                                                             
 89. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1386–87; see also Mountain Park 
Homeowners Ass’n v. Tydings, 864 P.2d 392, 395 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d en 
banc, 883 P.2d 1383 (Wash. 1994); Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ 
Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 74 (Colo. App. 1993). 
 90. Natelson, supra note 77, at 50–51; Uriel Reichman, Judicial Supervision of 
Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1978). Although Louisiana commentators do not 
follow the covenants theory utilized at common law and have acknowledged that 
predial servitudes and building restrictions can be used to create both negative and 
affirmative obligations, which are deemed real rights, issues still arise as to whether 
comprehensive declarations nonetheless exceed what is allowable under the law. See 
A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 229, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 449–
54 (4th ed. 2001). 
 91. See Christopher K. Odinet, Comment, Laying to Rest an Ancien Régime: 
Antiquated Institutions in Louisiana Civil Law and Their Incompatibility with Modern 
Public Policies, 70 LA. L. REV. 1367 (2010); see also Sally Brown Richardson, 
Nonuse and Easements: Creating a Pliability Regime of Private Eminent Domain, 78 
TENN. L. REV. 1 (2010); Winokur, supra note 88, at 7–16; Ritchie v. Carriage Oaks 
Homeowners Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Woodcreek Ass’n v. 
Bingle, 597 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ohio. App. 1991); Barber v. Dixon, 302 S.E.2d 915, 
916–17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Wisneiwski v. Starr, 393 So. 2d 488, 489 (Ala. 1980). 
 92. Steven Siegel, The Public Role in Establishing Private Residential 
Communities: Towards a New Formulation of Local Government Land Use Policies 
that Eliminates the Legal Requirements to Privatize New Communities in the United 
States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 867 (2006). 
 93. See MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER, & STEVEN W. BENDER, 1 LAW 
OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3:1 (2013) (“Unlike the stock market, the primary 
mortgage market is not a series of organized forums but a time-place continuum of 
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lenders range in size and scope depending on the market and the type 
of development.94 For instance, life insurance companies are 
traditionally the leaders in providing permanent financing for shopping 
malls, apartment complexes, and office buildings.95 Commercial 
banks, usually through a larger syndication with other lenders, and the 
collateral-mortgage-backed securities market provide the largest source 
of real estate financing in the country for short-term construction 
loans.96 And real estate investment trusts (commonly called “REITs”)97 
are highly sought-after lenders—particularly for hard-pressed 
borrowers and those seeking secondary financing—because of their 
willingness to take risks and the meager amount of governmental 
regulation that restricts their activities.98 And still there are other less 
traditional but still active real estate lenders such as private noninsured 
pension funds, governmental credit agencies, retirement and pension 
funds, certain corporations, and even individuals whose liability 
structure is well suited to long-term financing.99 
Regardless of the type of lender for a given development, the goal 
is the same: to ensure that the loan performs and is profitable.100 This 
                                                                                                             
 
interrelated lending points where bargains are struck by borrowers and lenders as to 
loan amounts and interest rates.”). 
 94. Id. (“The diversity within the mortgage market is reflected by preferences 
among lenders for mortgages for new versus old buildings; low-income versus luxury 
housing; urban versus rural real estate; private versus public ownership; improved 
versus unimproved land; general- versus special-purpose-use property (e.g., churches 
and bowling alleys), and so on.”). 
 95. See id. § 3:9. 
 96. Id. § 3:25. See also GERALD LINS, RITA KUMMER & THOMAS LEMKE, 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY 
MORTGAGE MARKET (2012–2013 ed). 
 97. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 856–60 (2006). 
 98. See MADISON ET AL., supra note 93, § 3:26 (“REITs derive their existence 
from a 1960 amendment to the Code that permits these entities to pay out cash flow 
distributions to trust shareholders without the imposition of a corporate tax on the 
earnings of the trust. This singular benefit of avoiding the double-taxation 
disadvantage of corporate taxation is accomplished mechanically by allowing a 
qualified REIT to take a deduction for dividends paid (including capital gain 
dividends) in computing its taxable income. However, in contrast to a partnership, a 
Subchapter S corporation, and a limited-liability company, a REIT cannot pass 
through its tax losses to the equity owners (shareholders) who own the beneficial 
interests in the corporation or trust.”). 
 99. Id. § 3:27 (“Another important group of players are foreign investors . . . . 
Their ability to compete with U.S. investors has strengthened because of their access 
to lower cost capital, more favorable exchange rates, and more modest expectations 
as to rates of return.”). 
 100. See ALVIN ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR’S DESKBOOK § 1:8 (2013) 
(“Real estate investments have almost always been the basis for more great fortunes 
than any other type of investment.”); see also id. § 4:7 (“A real estate lender, whether 
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aim is the principal driver for which types of demand are made on the 
borrower in terms of conditions, covenants, warranties, and obligations 
in the loan documentation process.101 In addition, numerous laws and 
regulations dictate the type of risks that financial lenders are allowed to 
take when making real-estate-related loans.102 Some of the basic 
agreements between the parties will be settled at the outset.103 For 
instance, the market forces and competition with other lenders 
typically bring the question of the interest rate to a conclusion early on, 
as well as the long-term amortization structure of the debt service 
requirements.104  
However, there are other matters—matters that implicate the CCR 
declaration structure discussed above—which can cause friction 
between the parties.105 The lender will be first and foremost concerned 
with the loan being sufficiently secured by the real estate collateral.106 
The lender will always be on guard for “incompetent management or 
fraudulent practices that milk the property during the loan term” and 
thereby “significantly reduce the value of the security.”107 To this end, 
the lender will almost always require that the borrower grant a mortgage 
on the property itself so that in the event there is a default, the 
development—including the improvements—can be seized and sold.108 
                                                                                                             
 
it is an institution (e.g., bank, thrift, or life insurance company) or a private or 
commercial lender (e.g., corporate financing company or real estate syndicate), has 
one primary objective: to determine the ability of the borrower to pay periodic debt 
service on the loan as well as any principal balance remaining at loan maturity. The 
lender begins with the borrower’s application, which should give a detailed 
description of both the property and the borrowers as well as a clear statement of the 
financing requested.”). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989, Pub. L. No. 101–73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as scattered sections of Titles 12 
and 15 of the U.S.C.A.); see also Donald Wood, Loye W. Young, Frederick Frost & 
Pamela Nichols, An Overview of FIRREA, 6 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW 43, 44–49 (July 
1990); Marc S. Lowenthal, Gerald W. McEvoy, John M. Rolls, Jr. & Nicholas J. 
Wood, The Impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on Lending Practices and Procedures of Savings Institutions, 
26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577 (1991). 
 103. See ARNOLD, supra note 100, § 4:3. 
 104. Id. (“Many lenders, for example, see eye-to-eye with the borrower about the 
desirability of high-ratio, long-term loans with low amortization on high-quality real 
estate, since the security for the loan cannot be faulted and the lender has minimum loan 
turnover, which reduces its overhead and operating expenses.”). 
 105. Id. These issues can generally revolve around, among other things, guarding 
against inflation and damage to the collateral. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. STUART M. SAFT, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 9:19 (3d. ed. 
2013). 
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The proceeds from the sale can then be applied against the outstanding 
debt owed by the borrower.109 The real estate that is offered as collateral 
for the loan is, quite often, far more important than the financial or 
economic strength of the borrower himself.110 During the loan approval 
phase, the lender will go to great lengths to analyze and investigate the 
property to ensure its value and whether it is viable as an income-
producing enterprise.111 
In a perfect world, the lender is able to fully recover the debt from 
the seizure and sale of the property.112 In reality, however, the sale of 
the collateral rarely results in a third-party buyer who pays an amount 
sufficient to satisfy the debt.113 This is no less true in Louisiana.114 
What often happens is that the lender itself purchases the property at 
the sheriff’s foreclosure sale and thereby becomes the owner for a 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. (“A mortgage or a deed of trust is any written instrument creating a lien 
on real property or by which title to the real property is held as security for the 
repayment of a debt.”). In Louisiana, only the mortgage is recognized as a valid 
conventional security interest in immovable property. See PETER S. TITLE, 1 
LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 13:17, in 1 LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES 
1109 (2013–2014 ed.). Neither deeds of trust, nor mortgages with a power of sale, are 
recognized in Louisiana. See generally id. 
 110. See ARNOLD, supra note 100, § 4:8. 
 111. Id. 
 112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 8.1–.6 (1997). 
 113. Id. § 8.3 cmt. a. 
Many commentators have observed that the foreclosure process 
commonly fails to produce the fair market value for foreclosed real estate  
. . . . There are several reasons for low bids at foreclosure sales. First, 
because the mortgage lender can “credit bid” up to the amount of the 
mortgage obligation without putting up new cash, it has a distinct bidding 
advantage over a potential third party bidder. Second, while foreclosure 
legislation usually requires published notice to potential third party 
purchasers, this notice, especially in urban areas, is frequently published 
in the classified columns of legal newspapers with limited circulation. 
Moreover, because the publication is usually highly technical, 
unsophisticated potential bidders have little idea as to the nature of the 
real estate being sold. Third, many potential third party purchasers are 
reluctant to buy land at a foreclosure sale because of the difficulty in 
ascertaining whether the sale will produce a good and marketable title and 
the absence of any warranty of title or of physical quality from the 
foreclosing mortgagee. Finally, when a mortgagee forecloses on improved 
real estate, potential bidders may find it difficult to inspect the premises 
prior to sale. Even though it may be in the self-interest of the mortgagor to 
allow such persons to inspect the premises, mortgagors who are about to 
lose their real estate through a foreclosure sale understandably are 
frequently reluctant to cooperate. 
Id. 
 114. See Michael H. Rubin & Jamie D. Seymour, Deficiency Judgments: An 
Overview, 69 LA. L. REV. 783 (2009). 
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period of time.115 During this time, it is in the lender’s best interest to 
ensure that the property maintains or increases in value and that cash 
flow continues or is augmented.116 If the value of the property remains 
high or is increased, the proceeds from the sale to a subsequent 
purchaser are likely to be more significant and thereby aid in helping 
the lender recover the loss from the failed loan.117 Similarly, 
continuous cash flow is equally important because, at least until the 
property can be sold, the bank can use the income produced from the 
property to mitigate its losses and pay for ongoing expenses.118 If the 
development is a residential subdivision, the continuous sale of lots, 
and the proceeds therefrom, are extremely desirable to the bank.119 
Also, if the development is an office building or shopping center, the 
lender will want to ensure the continued payment of rents and the 
procuring of new tenants for vacant spaces.120 
Nevertheless, all of these goals and desires of the lender that 
becomes the owner of the collateral after foreclosure depend upon the 
lender maintaining control over the development. Prior to the default and 
subsequent foreclosure, the developer has control and is able to regulate, 
guide, and direct the activities and management of the development 
through the various powers under the declaration.121 If common areas of 
the development—such as parking spaces or a community swimming 
pool—were in need of repair, the developer could charge a special, one-
time assessment against all the parcels or units to produce quick cash to 
                                                                                                             
 115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.3 (1997). 
 116. See FANNIE MAE, PROPERTY MAINTENANCE & MANAGEMENT: PROPERTY 
PRESERVATION MATRIX (2012), available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content 
/tool/property-preservation-matrix.pdf [http://perma.cc/9EUN-E69E] (archived Mar. 
10, 2014); see also Matthew S. Kirsch, How Low Can They Go: Remediating Bank 
Activity Restrictions and Incentives to Facilitate the Responsible Divestiture of REO 
Property, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 4 (2012). “REO (real estate-owned) properties” are those 
that are owned by a lender after a foreclosure where no third-party bidder purchased 
the property. See id. 
 117. Stephen L. Poe, Sale of REO Properties Under CERCLA: An Area of 
Continuing Environmental Risk for Lenders, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 43 (1991). 
 118. For a discussion on the importance of income-producing property to a lender, 
see MADISON ET AL., supra note 93, § 1:1. 
 119. See, e.g., Treatment of Real Estate Acquired Through Foreclosure Under the 
OTS’s Risk-Based Capital Regulations, Fed. Banking L. Rep. ¶ 82,584 (CCH), 1992 
WL 12610531 (Jan. 23, 1992). 
 120. See Thomas C. Homburgera & Lawrence A. Eiben, Who’s On First-
Protecting the Commercial Mortgage Lender: A Lender’s Overview of 
Subordination, Nondisturbance, and Attornment Agreements, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 411, 411 (2001) (“The true value of commercial real estate is determined 
largely by the capitalization of its net income. . . . Lenders must consider, at a 
minimum, the obligations and liabilities of the parties under the leases, the right of 
successors-in-title to the real estate to benefit from the leases, and the extent to which 
the all-important rental income can be reduced, offset, or interrupted.”). 
 121. See supra Part I.B and accompanying discussion. 
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fund the repairs.122 If the activities of certain owners and their guests 
were unruly or undesirable, the developer could use his or her powers 
under the declaration to promulgate rules to prohibit such activity.123 
Everything from guidelines on what types and styles of improvements 
homeowners in the subdivision can construct on their lots to the type of 
alarm systems and wall paint a tenant can utilize within its office space 
can fall within the purview of the declaration and thereby under the 
control of the developer.124 This authority bestows great power on the 
developer to ensure that the vision of quality, beauty, and aesthetic that 
was initially envisioned for the development remains, even after 
possession or ownership of certain portions of the project have been sold 
to third parties.125 
The importance of controlling the declaration is no less important 
to lenders.126 This is particularly evident when they become the owners 
of the property after a foreclosure sale.127 The lender needs to ensure 
that the property is carefully regulated, its activities are coordinated, 
and its value maintained so that any losses from the nonperforming 
loan can be offset by income produced from—or the proceeds from the 
eventual sale of—the property.128 In order to achieve these essential 
objectives, the lender will very often require that, when the loan is 
made, the borrower not only grant a mortgage on all of the real 
property and improvements of the development but also grant a 
security right in the declaration itself.129 In this case, when the 
                                                                                                             
 122. See supra Part I.B. 
 123. See supra Part I.B. 
 124. See supra Part I.B. 
 125. See supra Part I.B. 
 126. See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Elizabeth A. Kelly & John Travis 
Marshall, Crisis Management: Principles That Should Guide the Disposition of 
Federally Owned, Foreclosed Properties, 45 IND. L. REV. 305 (2012). 
 127. See generally Julie A. Tappendorf & Brent O. Denzin, Turning Vacant 
Properties into Community Assets Through Land Banking, 43 URB. LAW. 801 (2011). 
 128. For a discussion of the importance and utility of declarations of covenants, 
restrictions, and conditions in real estate developments, see supra Part I.B. 
 129. See, e.g., Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for 
Lockwood Folly, art. I, § 11, available at http://www.lockwoodfollypoa.org/PDF 
/MDCDocs/Section%203%20MASTER%20DECLARATION%20OF%20COVE 
NANTS%2042012%20(2).pdf [http://perma.cc/NB5Q-N95T] (archived Mar. 10, 
2014) (“The Declarant may assign or pledge any or all of its rights reserved under the 
land use documents through an assignment or in an instrument of conveyance or 
assignment.” (emphasis added)); Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and 
Restrictions of Wyncroft, Ex. A, item (g), available at  http://www.wyncroft.org 
/WHA%20Covenants%20with%20Amend%201.pdf  [http://perma.cc/4HTP-NGNQ ] 
(archived Mar. 17, 2014) (“Declarant shall have the right and power to assign and 
delegate to the respective associations, or any successor or successors thereto, at any 
time and from time to time, all or any part of any of the rights, powers, and authority 
contained in this Declaration.” (emphasis added)). For an example of such a clause in 
Louisiana, see Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Segnette 
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borrower defaults and the lender forecloses on the mortgage, the lender 
can also exercise its rights under the declaration. The mechanics and 
effects of such an exercise of security rights by the lender are discussed 
below and underscore the crucial role that the declaration plays even 
after the development is foreclosed upon. 
II. COLLATERALIZING CONTROL 
While the declaration provides a wide range of powers and 
advantages to a lender in the event the property must be obtained or 
taken over by the lender in a foreclosure sale, it is not always easy or 
clear how such a complex and multifaceted instrument like a 
declaration can be collateralized. As discussed here, declarations 
comprise a myriad of different legal concepts and doctrines that help 
make the common-interest regime possible. But it is this complexity 
that makes collateralizing the rights so difficult. In fact, because so 
many different types of property rights are involved in the construction 
and functionality of declarations, in most cases these rights cannot be 
collectively collateralized in one omnibus security device. Rather, each 
different aspect of the declaration must be collateralized and dealt with 
separately. 
A. Under Mortgage Law—Immovable Aspects of CCRs 
The first and perhaps most obvious type of security device to be 
used in collateralizing declaration rights is under Louisiana’s law of 
mortgages because of the essential role played in CCRs by building 
restrictions and servitudes (both immovables). Without question, CCRs 
comprise a number of servitudes and building restrictions that are 
essential in giving the goals of the declaration enforceability under the 
law.130 Without these legal devices, few if any of the limitations and 
rules within a declaration would have any effect at all.131 A building 
restriction in the declaration might prevent an owner from building a 
fence out of chain link on his or her property, or a servitude might 
grant to the owners’ association the right to traverse an owner’s yard in 
                                                                                                             
 
Estates, Article XIII, available at http://www.rad65.com/Segnette%20Estates/SE. 
Declaration_conditions_restrictions.pdf [http://perma.cc/6XXG-JRC9] (archived 
Mar. 10, 2014) (“Declarant’s Rights. Any or all of the special rights and obligations 
of the Declarant set forth in this Declaration or the By-Laws may be transferred in 
whole or in part to other Persons.” (emphasis added)). 
 130. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 192, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE 512 (3d ed. 2004). See also Callies, supra note 20, at 325–27. 
 131. See Callies, supra note 20, at 325–27. 
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order to conduct maintenance on a carefully preserved live oak tree.132 
However, the combination of these two devices to achieve the goals of 
a declaration has not always been so readily accepted.133 
As a general matter, negative restrictions and restraints imposed by 
a declaration—such as a prohibition on erecting a structure within a 
certain number of feet from the street or right-of-way—have been 
widely accepted by Louisiana courts.134 Provided they meet all the 
necessary legal requirements, these restrictions are characterized as 
predial servitudes, and the negative obligations that are entailed in 
them are real rights that travel with the land into whosever hands it 
finds itself.135 Therefore, the developer may include certain restrictions 
on the uses, height, and size of improvements in the declaration and 
impose those restrictions, through the use of predial servitudes, 
throughout the development.136 As lots are individually sold, the 
predial servitudes stay in place and continue to burden the property 
even though the developer no longer has an ownership interest in the 
parcels.137 
However, for many years the notion of imposing real rights that 
carried affirmative obligations was met with great uncertainty.138 
French courts attempted to give enforceability to these types of 
restrictions by expanding the notion of personal obligations and the 
transfer of related immovable property.139 Louisiana courts, however, 
took a different approach and created a sort of special real right that 
has become known as the “building restriction.”140 These devices—
                                                                                                             
 132. For discussion of the various instances of such restrictions, see Patrick 
Johnson, Jr., The Civil Code Articles on Building Restrictions: A Critical Analysis, 53 
TUL. L. REV. 583 (1979); Martin Smith, Jr., Building Restrictions in Louisiana, 21 
LA. L. REV. 468 (1961). See also Louisiana Homeowners Association Act, LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.4–.6 (2008). 
 133. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 192, at 512. See also Callies, supra note 
20, at 325–27. 
 134. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 229, at 449–54 (citing Goodwin v. 
Alexander, 30 So. 102 (La. 1901); CIVIL CODE [C. CIV.] art. 689 (Fr.); 3 M. PLANIOL 
ET G. RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS: LES BIENS, § 923, in 3 
DROIT CIVIL (2d ed. Picard 1952); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1120 
(Greece); Balis, Civil Law Property 315 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek); cf. BURGERLICHES 
GESETZBUCH [B.G.B.] § 1018 (Ger.); W. DEHNER, § 31 in NACHBARRECHT IM 
BUNDESGEBIET § 31 28II (6th ed. 1982). See also McGuffy v. Weil, 125 So. 2d 154 
(La. 1960); cf. Holloway v. Ransome, 43 So. 2d 673 (La. 1949)). 
 135. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 229, at 449–54. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Cambais v. Douglas, 120 So. 369 (La. 1929). 
 139. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 229, at 449–54. 
 140. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 191, at 376–81. See also Willis v. New 
Orleans East Unit of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc., 156 So. 2d 310 (La. Ct. App. 1963); 
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often explained as being closely akin to predial servitudes—were 
described as “charges on immovable property imposed ‘in pursuant of 
a general plan governing building standards, specified uses, and 
improvements.’”141 Finally, a formal statutory regime, patterned after 
the framework that had been developed by Louisiana courts, was 
adopted by the Legislature in 1977 through the enactment of Civil 
Code articles 775 through 783.142 The true utility of these devices is 
their ability to impose affirmative duties, such that the declarant can 
force individual owners of parcels or units that are encumbered with 
the restriction to perform affirmative acts.143 Much like the use of CCR 
declarations across the United States, building restrictions (covenants), 
in combination with predial servitudes (easements), have been 
considered one of the most important tools for real estate development 
in Louisiana and are largely, if not completely, responsible for the 
enforceability of CCRs.144 
However, that is not to say that building restrictions provide free 
reign to developers.145 As long recognized by Louisiana courts, parties 
are not free to create whatever real rights they wish.146 Rather, as 
articulated by the Romans, real rights are “numerous clausus,” 
meaning that they are a closed class and a category unto themselves.147 
Private individuals are generally not given carte blanche to 
contractually create whatever unique type of real right that may suit 
their needs.148 Although courts have allowed for some exceptions—
                                                                                                             
 
Cunningham v. Hall, 148 So. 2d 808 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Cmty. Builders, Inc. v. 
Scarborough, 149 So. 2d 141 (La. Ct. App. 1962). 
 141. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 191, at 376–81 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 775). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See Martin Smith, Jr., Building Restrictions in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 468 
(1961); Eugene G. Taggart, “Equitable Restrictions” in Louisiana, 33 TUL. L. REV. 
822 (1959); see also M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS: LES BIENS § 923 (2d ed. 1952). 
 144. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 191, at 376–81; see also Callies, 
supra note 20, at 325–26; TITLE, supra note 109, §§ 3:48–:49. 
 145. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 217, at 414–17 and accompanying 
discussion of the numerous clausus. 
 146. See id.; cf. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 67 So. 641, 728–29 (La. 
1915) (“[W]hile the public policy of the state opposes the putting of property out of 
commerce, it at the same time favors the fullest liberty of contract (article 1764, C. 
C.), and the widest latitude possible in the right to dispose of one's property as one 
lists (article 491, C. C.), so long as no disposition is sought to be made contrary to 
good morals, public order, or express law.”). 
 147. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 216, at 413–14 (citing Pugliese, Diritti 
Reali, in Enciclopedia del Diritto (1964); Weisman, Some Fundamental Concepts of 
Property Law: A Critical Survey, 21 ISR. L. REV. 529, 565 (1986)). 
 148. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 217, at 414–17. 
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such as in the case of mineral rights, limited personal servitudes, and 
building restrictions prior to codification149—for the most part such 
free contractual license has been looked upon negatively.150 In a 
seminal case, the Louisiana Supreme Court praised Louisiana’s 
property law system as being “that of simple, uniform and absolute 
dominion” and said that its narrow and limited statutory allowances for 
the creation of real rights are “abundantly sufficient to meet all the 
warrants of civilization, and there is no warrant of law, nor reason of 
policy for the introduction of any other.”151 
In the context of building restrictions, there are a few important 
requirements that can often be overlooked—and therefore destroy the 
entire regime.152 First is the need for a general plan of development, and 
equally important is that this plan must be “feasible and capable of being 
preserved.”153 Restrictions that are ambiguous or vague will be denied 
enforcement.154 Another essential requirement is that the imposition of 
the building restrictions must be fairly uniform across the entire 
development.155 A failure of uniformity may cause the building 
restriction to fall into the category of a predial servitude, and if it fails to 
meet the requirements for such a servitude, the restriction will fail 
altogether.156 Lastly and most importantly, the ability to impose 
                                                                                                             
 149. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (2009) (“Unless expressly or impliedly 
prohibited from doing so, individuals may renounce or modify what is established in 
their favor by the provisions of this Code if the renunciation or modification does not 
affect the rights of others and is not contrary to the public good.”). See also A. N. 
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES §§ 223–31, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 455–77 (4th ed. 2000); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, §§ 191–200, at 
511–35. 
 150. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 217, at 414–17 (stating that courts have 
repeatedly declared that “the modifications of the right of property under our laws are 
few and easily understood, and answer all the purposes of reasonable use. It is 
incumbent on courts to maintain them in their simplicity.” (citing Harper v. 
Stanbrough, 2 La. Ann. 377, 382 (La. 1847))). See also Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas 
Co., 97 So. 666, 668 (La. 1923). 
 151. See State v. McDonogh’s Ex’rs, 8 La. Ann. 171, 251 (La. 1853). 
 152. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 193, at 515–19. 
 153. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 775 (2014); see also Schwab v. Kelton, 405 So. 2d 
1239 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Gwatney v. Miller, 371 So. 2d 1355 (La. Ct. App. 1979); 
Bruce v. Simonson Invs., Inc., 207 So. 2d 360 (La. 1968); Salerno v. De Lucca, 30 
So. 2d 678 (La. 1947); Alfortish v. Wagner, 7 So. 2d 708 (La. 1942). 
 154. See Olivier v. Berggren, 136 So. 2d 325 (La. Ct. App. 1962). 
 155. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 195, at 523. See also Murphy v. Marino, 
60 So. 2d 128 (La. Ct. App. 1952); In re Congregation of St. Rita Roman Catholic 
Church, 130 So. 2d 425 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (imposing restrictions on only 40% of 
the parcels within the development was not enough to satisfy the requirements for 
valid building restrictions of the lots); Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So. 2d 554 (La. Ct. 
App. 1958); cf. Rabouin v. Dutrey, 160 So. 393 (La. 1935). 
 156. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 193, at 515. 
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affirmative duties is not without limit.157 Any affirmative acts must be 
“reasonable and necessary for the maintenance of the general plan.”158 
The requirement that owners become members of a collective 
association and the requirement that they accept the duty to share in the 
cost and expenses of maintaining common areas have both been deemed 
valid affirmative building restrictions by Louisiana courts.159 However, 
requiring acts, the demand of which are subject to the capricious 
discretion of the declarant or that restrict the property to the detriment 
of public policy, are not valid.160 
Building restrictions161 and servitudes,162 as discussed above, are 
both classified as incorporeal immovables under the Louisiana Civil 
Code.163 This is because both building restrictions and servitudes can 
only affect immovable property.164 When “the object of a real right is 
an immovable, the right is an incorporeal immovable.”165 In the 
context of a declaration, the object of the real right is the land upon 
which the common interest community will be constructed.166 Because 
the land is a corporeal immovable, the real rights associated with it are 
incorporeal immovables.167 
                                                                                                             
 157. See id. § 195, at 523. 
 158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 778 (2014). See also Louisiana Homeowners Association 
Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1141.4–.6 (1999); Allen Scott Crigler, Some 
Observations on Building Restrictions, 41 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1208 (1981). 
 159. See Town S. Estates Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. Walker, 332 So. 2d 889 (La. Ct. 
App. 1976) (upholding annual assessments); Nepveaux v. Linwood Realty Co., 435 
So. 2d 589, 591 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding restrictions stating that “[a]ny house 
erected . . . shall have a minimum cost of $40,000.00 and 2,200 square feet”). 
However, interestingly, Louisiana courts have held that the failure to pay assessments 
is a personal obligation of the owner that remains with the owner, even after the 
owner has sold the property that is burdened with the real right that imposed the fee in 
the first place. See Vill. Square Shopping Ctr. Ass’n v. Nelson, 522 So. 2d 163 (La. 
Ct. App. 1988); see also Mariner’s Vill. Master Ass’n, Inc. v. Cont’l Props., 639 So. 
2d 1188 (La. Ct. App. 1994); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Common, Public, and Private 
Things, 37 LA. L. REV. 317, 329–30 (1977); cf. Tall Timbers Owners’ Ass’n v. 
Merritt, 376 So. 2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
 160. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 195, at 523. 
 161. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 777 (2014). 
 162. See id. art. 649; A. N. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: 
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1968); YIANNOPOULOS, supra 
note 130, § 6, at 18. 
 163. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337. See also Callies, supra note 
20, at 325–26. 
 164. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337. 
 165. Id. at 338. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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Immovable rights can only be collateralized through the use of a 
mortgage.168 This is because of Louisiana’s exclusivity approach to the 
types of property that can be mortgaged.169 Civil law countries, even 
more so than their common law cousins, take a very narrow view of 
the types of rights that can be created in property.170 As such, 
Louisiana law only allows for five categories of property that may be 
made subject to a mortgage, and any other attempts to expand this list 
through contract is ineffective.171 Louisiana Civil Code article 3286 
limits mortgage to only (1) corporeal immovable property, including 
its component parts; (2) rights of usufruct with respect to a corporeal 
immovable; (3) a servitude of right of use, including any 
accompanying rights associated with buildings and other constructions 
located on the land subject to the servitude; (4) a lessee’s rights in a 
lease of an immovable, including the rights to any buildings or other 
constructions located on the leased land; and (5) any additional 
property that might be made available for mortgaging through a special 
enactment of the legislature.172 Although not specifically stated in 
article 3286, building restrictions—due to being substantially similar to 
servitudes and also comprising real rights in a corporeal immovable—
may also be encumbered by a mortgage.173 
Thus, the portions of the declaration that consist of building 
restrictions and servitudes must be collateralized under the law of 
mortgage.174 The lender will typically already have a conventional 
mortgage on the real estate comprising the development itself in 
connection with making the loan.175 And the encumbrance of the land 
automatically includes any and all building restrictions and servitudes 
that might exist on the property.176 Nevertheless, when encumbering 
                                                                                                             
 168. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3286 (2014); see also Voorhies v. De Blanc, 12 La. 
Ann. 864 (La. 1857). 
 169. See art. 3286; Miller v. Michoud, 11 Rob. 225 (La. 1845); Penn v. Ott, 12 La. 
Ann. 233 (La. 1857); State v. Mexican Gulf Ry. Co., 3 Rob. 513 (La. 1843). 
 170. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002) (“The law of every jurisdiction defines a set of well-
recognized forms that property rights can take and burdens the creation of property 
rights that deviate from those conventional forms. In this respect, property law differs 
from contract law, which generally leaves parties free to craft contractual rights in any 
form they wish. Scholars in civil law countries have long been self-conscious about 
the law’s constraints on property rights.”). 
 171. Art. 3286. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See generally YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337. 
 174. Art. 3286. See also Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 69 So. 800 (La. 1915). 
 175. See generally Alfred G. Kyle, Commercial Real Estate Construction 
Lending, 22 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW 7 (2006). 
 176. LA. CIV. CODE art. 650 (2014). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1051 
(2008). 
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the CCR declaration—which is itself a separate piece of collateral from 
the land—it may be desirable to separately describe the servitudes and 
building restrictions, not because this is legally required, but rather to 
make clear the intent of the parties and to put courts and third parties 
on notice of the parties’ intent and the scope of the mortgage.177 
Because the real rights being collateralized under the CCRs are so 
complex and particular to these types of transactions, the specific 
building restrictions and servitudes that are set forth in the declaration 
should be described with specificity in the mortgage document.178 In 
this way, the mortgagee (the lender) and the mortgagor (the developer–
owner) are able to evidence the intent behind the security contract with 
regard to the exact nature of the rights being mortgaged—specifically 
that they are being collateralized as part of the larger collateralization 
of the CCRs.179 
The lender will have to ensure that when portions of the 
development are released from the mortgage on the land that the 
mortgage rights arising under the collateralization of the CCRs are not 
similarly released. For instance, a lender might release lots within a 
subdivision from the overall real estate mortgage as the developer sells 
individual parcels within the neighborhood. However, until the lender 
is fully paid and the debt is extinguished, it will want to maintain its 
mortgage rights insofar as they impact the CCRs. This means that the 
servitudes and building restrictions that continue to encumber each of 
the lots, even after they are sold to independent, third-party 
homeowners, must still be maintained subject to the CCR mortgage in 
favor of the lender. Thus, it is desirable to mortgage these rights 
separately from one another to ensure that they are not both 
inadvertently released at the same time. However, there is a theoretical 
problem that arises here because of the way in which Louisiana law 
conceptualizes servitudes and the property to which they are 
attached.180 Comment (e) to Louisiana Civil Code article 3286 states 
that “[a] mortgage of the dominant estate implicitly covers all predial 
servitudes belonging to it. Neither can such a servitude be mortgaged 
separately.”181 Because a predial servitude cannot be encumbered 
separately from the land over which it lies, creating a separate 
collateralization would seem impossible.182 Under this principle, there 
would be no way to prevent the release of the lender’s mortgage rights 
                                                                                                             
 177. See generally art. 3286. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. cmt. e. 
 181. See id.; see also id. art. 650 (“A predial servitude is inseparable from the 
dominant estate and passes with it. The right of using the servitude cannot be 
alienated, leased, or encumbered separately from the dominant estate.”). 
 182. Id. art. 650. 
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over only the land, without also losing its rights in the CCRs that affect 
that parcel.183 Nevertheless, it may be possible to overcome this 
theoretical challenge by classifying the servitude aspects of the CCRs 
as being limited personal servitudes, rather than being predial in 
nature.184 Although prohibited for predial servitudes, the Civil Code 
specifically sanctions the use of personal servitudes of use as collateral, 
and thus it is possible to separately collateralize these types of rights 
under a distinct and separate mortgage.185 This classification seems 
wholly consistent with the workings of servitudes in declarations since 
they essentially represent real rights that are granted in favor of a 
juridical person (namely, the homeowners’ association) rather than to a 
dominant estate.186 The ability to enforce setback lines and uniformity 
of landscaping, among other things, are all to the benefit of the 
association and its members, rather than to the actual parcels 
themselves.187 
Thus, while it is technically possible to include both the mortgage 
of the real property and the mortgage of the servitudes and building 
restrictions in the same agreement and only release certain rights for 
certain purposes at certain times, it would seem more practical and 
efficient to address them in separate documents to avoid error and an 
inadvertent release of rights. 
B. Under UCC Article 9—Movable Aspects of CCRs 
Just as aspects of the CCRs comprise rights that arise in connection 
with immovable property, there are other facets that might be more 
                                                                                                             
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. art. 3286. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See LaFargue v. U.S., 4 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. La. 1998) (“Louisiana law 
recognizes that parties may create a personal servitude of right of use in favor of a 
natural person or legal entity for a specified use of an estate less than full enjoyment. 
La. C.C. art. 641. In contrast to a predial servitude, which benefits a dominant estate, 
a personal servitude is for the benefit of a designated person or legal entity. However, 
the right of use may confer only an advantage that may be established by a predial 
servitude, id. art. 640, and such personal servitudes are regulated by the rules 
governing predial servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the 
rules governing personal servitudes. Id. art. 645.3 The Civil Code also provides that a 
right of use is transferable unless prohibited by law or contract.”). 
 187. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 149, § 8:3, at 523–27 (explaining various 
examples of limited personal servitude that may be created by private contract: 
“[t]hus, the rights of passage, of aqueduct, of light, or of view, may be stipulated in 
favor of a person rather than an estate. It is the same as to fishing or hunting rights, 
and the taking of fruits or products from an immovable.”); see also Parish of West 
Feliciana ex rel. West Feliciana Parish Police Jury v. Thompson, 2009 WL 839525, at 
*1 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2009). 
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appropriately classified as incorporeal movable rights.188 These rights 
include contract rights that are collectively established between the unit 
or lot owners and the developer pursuant to the declaration.189 As 
discussed above, the exact nature of these rights have caused some 
frustration among Louisiana courts because of the way in which these 
rights have the effect of creating real rights that bind heirs, successors, 
and assignees of the original parties to the contract but have many of 
the features of personal contractual obligations.190 This distinction is 
important because only certain, narrow types of rights in immovable 
property can be encumbered under the law of mortgage.191 Similarly, 
only rights that arise in connection with movables can be collateralized 
under Louisiana’s version of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC article 9).192 It is because of this mixed-bag of property 
rights that coalesce together to form a declaration of CCRs that lenders 
and their counsel are often left a bit perplexed as to how to effectively 
collateralize such an important but very complex document.193 
As a general matter, all rights, obligations, and actions are, in 
theory, movable, but the law sometimes treats them, for legal purposes, 
as immovable-related rights when the object of the right, obligation, or 
action is an immovable.194 This legal fiction is articulated in Louisiana 
Civil Code article 470, which declares, in part, that “[r]ights and 
actions that apply to immovable things are incorporeal immovables” 
and include things like servitudes and building restrictions.195 For these 
rights, the law of mortgage is the correct security device.196 However, 
incorporeal rights—such as the declaration rights that are more 
contract based—must be collateralized under UCC article 9.197 
Louisiana Civil Code article 473 states that “[r]ights, obligations, and 
actions that apply to a movable thing are incorporeal movables. 
Movables of this kind are such as bonds, annuities, and interest or 
shares in entities possessing juridical personality.”198 
One particularly important contract-based, incorporeal movable 
right arising under the CCRs is the declarant’s ability to control the 
association until such time as a certain number of lots or units are 
                                                                                                             
 188. See supra Parts I–II and accompanying discussion. 
 189. See supra Parts I–II. 
 190. See supra Part II.A. 
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
 192. See JASON J. KILBORN, LOUISIANA SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS 3–4 (2006); 
MICHAEL H. RUBIN, LOUISIANA LAW OF SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS 271–75 
(2011). 
 193. See generally KILBORN, supra note 192; RUBIN, supra note 192. 
 194. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337. 
 195. LA. CIV. CODE art. 470 (2014). 
 196. See supra Part II.A. 
 197. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 3–4; RUBIN, supra note 192, at 271–75. 
 198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 473 (2014). 
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leased or sold to third parties.199 In other words, for a certain period of 
time after construction has commenced and after the development has 
been completed, the declarant will retain the ability to solely or 
primarily appoint the members of the board of directors of the 
association.200 By doing so, the director maintains control over the 
operation, revenues, expenditures, and decision-making of the 
development.201 The control rights under the declaration are akin to the 
way in which a party exercises control over a corporation through 
ownership of all or a majority of the shares of stock in that company.202 
In this way, the declarant’s rights of control over the association are 
classified as a form of incorporeal movable under Louisiana Civil 
Code article 473.203 
UCC article 9 incorporates the idea of using incorporeal movables 
as collateral through several different types of collateral categories.204 
These include the right to demand payment for services that have been 
rendered or goods that have been sold or leased (accounts receivable), 
the right to demand payment of money from a depositary institution 
(deposit accounts), the right to recover against an individual in tort (tort 
claims and judgments), and, last but not least, the catch-all category of 
general intangibles.205 As discussed below, this last category—that of 
general intangibles—best fits the types of contract-based rights that are 
found in CCRs.206  
Rights that have been held to constitute general intangibles under 
the UCC article 9 analysis include rights in intellectual property, such 
as copyrights, patents, and trademarks, rights under a franchise or 
license agreement, causes of action (except for those arising in tort), 
and goodwill.207 Importantly, the general intangible collateral category 
is considered to be a catch-all, residual grouping such that if a type of 
movable cannot fit under one of the other categories, it will be deemed 
                                                                                                             
 199. See supra Part II.B–C and accompanying discussion. 
 200. See supra Part II.B–C and accompanying discussion. 
 201. See supra Part II.B–C and accompanying discussion. 
 202. See GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
§§ 14.01–.05, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 419–26 (1999). 
 203. See art. 473; see also Moreland v. Rucker Pharmacal Co., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 537 
(W.D. La. 1973); McRoberts v. Hayes, 181 So. 2d 390 (La. 1965); Succession of 
McGuire, 92 So. 40 (La. 1922). 
 204. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-102(a)(2), (29), (42), :9-109(d)(9), (12) 
(2002); see also KILBORN, supra note 192, at 9–10. 
 205. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 9–10. 
 206. See § 10:9-102(a)(42). 
 207. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 10. See also § 10:9-102(a)(42) (“‘General 
intangible’ means any personal property, including things in action, other than 
accounts, chattel paper, tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, 
investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, life insurance policies, 
and money. The term includes payment intangibles and software.”). 
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to represent a form of general intangible.208 Louisiana law has little 
jurisprudence interpreting the definition of “general intangibles” and 
often looks to common law courts in interpreting their versions of UCC 
article 9 in helping to make the determination.209 Because these CCR 
contract-based rights do not fit into any of the other incorporeal 
movable categories described above (i.e., accounts receivable, deposit 
accounts, and tort claims/judgments), the catch-all category is most 
appropriate. The residual nature of this category evidences the intent of 
the drafters of UCC article 9 and courts that have interpreted it to 
ensure that those particular rights in movable property that fail to meet 
the more narrowly drawn parameters of the other collateral categories 
nevertheless find a home in the catch-all of general intangibles.210 
A slightly colorable argument may be made that the control rights 
under the declaration are not really general intangible rights but are 
rather a form of investment property.211 As stated above, the right to 
control the association’s board of directors is arguably similar to the 
declarant owning a controlling number of shares of stock in the 
association.212 Investment property is another form of UCC article 9 
collateral that is separate and apart from the various forms of 
incorporeal movables described above. Investment property includes 
securities and commodity contracts “of the kind traded in investment 
markets and regulated in part by Article 8 of the UCC.”213 Shares of 
stocks in a corporation are also included in this classification.214 
UCC article 9 contemplates a complicated system for granting 
security (both in its attachment and perfection) in investment property 
that hinges, in part, on whether the property right is certificated or 
uncertificated and whether it is held directly or indirectly by the 
owner.215 While the right to dictate the makeup of a corporate board is 
one of the rights that arises under shares of stock, stock also brings 
with it various other rights—including rights to profits and a distinct 
                                                                                                             
 208. See Johnson v. Cottonport Bank, 259 B.R. 125 (W.D. La. 2000). 
 209. In re A. Angelle, Inc., 230 B.R. 287 (W.D. La. 1998) (“Although there are no 
Louisiana cases on point, case law from other jurisdictions uniformly holds that 
franchise agreements and licenses fall within the definition of “general intangibles.”). 
See, e.g., In re Scheidmantel Olds–Cadillac, Inc., 144 B.R. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1992); In 
re Topsy’s Shoppes, Inc., 131 B.R. 886, 888 (D. Kan. 1991); In re Hengalo 
Enterprises, Inc., 51 B.R. 54 (S.D. Fla. 1985). 
 210. See generally Christopher K. Odinet, Testing the Reach of UCC Article 9: 
The Question of Tax Credit Collateral in Secured Transactions, 64 S.C. L. REV. 143 
(2012). 
 211. See § 10:9-102(a)(49). 
 212. See supra Part II.B. 
 213. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 8–9. See also 3 PETER A. ALCES ET AL., 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE § 27:03 (2013). 
 214. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 8–9. 
 215. See id. at 8–9, 28–31. 
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ownership interest in the legal entity itself.216 The declarant’s right to 
control the board of the association is less like these other stock rights. 
The declarant does not own the association due to his or her control 
powers, nor does he or she derive a profit from the association in the 
same way that a shareholder is entitled to dividend payments.217 In 
fact, the association is almost always qualified as a tax-exempt 
organization such that its operations and revenues cannot inure to the 
benefit of any private individual.218 Thus, while it may be compelling 
to draw a parallel between this aspect of CCRs to the rights of control 
that arise in connection with shares of stock—and thus classify it as 
UCC article 9 investment property—it is more accurately classified as 
a form of UCC article 9 general intangible property.219 But to be safe, a 
lender may choose to take a belt-and-suspenders approach and obtain a 
collateral interest in the control rights of the declarant under both the 
investment property method220 and under the method for collateralizing 
general intangibles.221 
C. Under the Law of Pledge—Gap Filling 
Lastly, any discussion of the complexity and intricacies of 
collateralizing a declaration of CCRs would not be complete without at 
least visiting the law of pledge.222 Until the advent of UCC article 9 in 
Louisiana, the Civil Code articles on the law of pledge served as the 
                                                                                                             
 216. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 202, §§ 25.01–26.04, at 633–55. 
 217. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.1–.9 (Supp. 2014); see also LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1121.101–.108 (2008). 
 218. See Carl B. Kress, Comment, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions 
Governing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837 (1995); 
MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 7. 
 219. See ALCES ET AL., supra note 213 (“Section 9–106 of the Code treats ‘general 
intangibles,’ collateral that does not fit within the other denominated categories, but 
which, nevertheless, has commercial value when hypothecated to a secured party. The 
majority of the cases treating collateral interests in general intangibles involve 
classification issues. Because the only way to perfect a collateral interest in a general 
intangible is by filing, a court’s classification of a property interest as a general 
intangible may frustrate the expectations of a secured party who failed to perfect its 
interest in the general intangible by filing. To protect the collateral from later 
challenges, the provident creditor will consistently treat items of dubious 
classification as general intangibles and file. The Official Comment to Section 9–106 
lists several examples of general intangibles: goodwill, literary rights, rights to 
performance copyrights, trademarks and patents. Courts have determined that the 
general intangible classification is quite broad and that many property interests may 
fall within the scope of the classification. Interests in general intangibles arising in the 
future may be subject to the secured party’s collateral interest by including general 
intangibles within the scope of the after-acquired property clause.”). 
 220. See KILBORN, supra note 192, at 8–9, 28–31. 
 221. Id. at 10, 12–19. 
 222. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3133–3181 (2014). 
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primary vehicle by which to grant a security interest in movable 
property.223 The law of pledge is steeped in civil law history and—
representative of its longevity—the pledge articles have remained 
relatively unchanged since the Civil Code of 1870.224 
Much like the law of mortgage and UCC article 9, a right under the 
law of pledge is an accessory obligation225 that provides security for 
the performance of the principle obligation.226 And, like the other two 
security devices discussed above, a pledge creates a real right in the 
collateral, which gives the creditor the right to seize and sell the 
property in satisfaction of the debt.227 As to what types of property may 
be the object of a pledge, Louisiana Civil Code article 3142 states quite 
broadly that a debtor may “pledge whatever belongs to him,” which 
includes any incorporeal rights he or she may have in property.228 The 
various types of property that Louisiana courts have recognized as 
being susceptible of pledge include, among other things, security rights 
in shares of stock,229 the right to collect proceeds from a mineral 
lease,230 and even crops.231 And, setting aside UCC article 9, because 
the movable aspects of CCRs are incorporeal, they too may be the 
object of a contract of pledge.232 
However, one particularly interesting characteristic of the law of 
pledge is that it has historically required that the creditor maintain 
possession of the movable collateral in order to maintain his or her 
                                                                                                             
 223. In actuality, pledge is meant to encompass both pawn (the pledge of 
movables) and antichresis (the pledge of an immovable). However, for purposes of 
the article, the term “pledge” is used to mean the granting of a security interest under 
the law of pledge is only a movable. This is the common use of the term because 
antichresis has been so seldom used in modern Louisiana history. See id. art. 3134; 
see also id. art. 3135 (“A thing is said to be pawned when a movable thing is given as 
security; and the antichresis, when the security given consists in immovables.”). It 
should be noted that, as of this writing, the Louisiana State Law Institute is 
recommending a comprehensive revision to the law of pledge to clarify and update 
its rather dated provisions. 
 224. See RUBIN, supra note 192, at 61; see also Succession of Lanaux, 15 So. 708, 
711–12 (La. 1894) (“The symbol of the pledge, in the Roman law, is the fist of the 
creditor closed on the pledge, denoting that actual possession which all recognize as 
linked to the pledge, and without which none can exist.”). 
 225. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3137 (2014). 
 226. See id. art. 3136. 
 227. See id. arts. 3133–3181; see also RUBIN, supra note 192, at 61. 
 228. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3142 (2014). 
 229. New Orleans Nat. Banking Ass’n v. Wiltz, 10 F. 330 (E.D. La. 1881). 
 230. Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. 3 v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 882 F.2d 1008 (5th 
Cir. 1989). 
 231. Weill v. Kent, 28 So. 295 (La. 1900); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Sullivan, 
41 So. 480 (La. 1906). 
 232. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3153 (2014). 
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security right.233 And in the case of incorporeal rights—which of 
course cannot be reduced to physical possession—the Code requires 
that something must be substituted as a symbol to take the place of 
actual delivery.234 Thus, generally mere agreement of the parties to 
pledge an incorporeal right is not sufficient to effect fictitious 
possession to the pledgee;235 rather, some kind of symbol of the right 
must be delivered to the creditor.236 For example, “shares of stock in a 
corporation may be pledged by delivery of the stock certificate 
evidencing the interest in the corporation.”237 For a lender seeking to 
obtain a security right in a declaration of CCRs under the law of 
pledge, actual possession of the document would be impracticable—
chiefly because the declaration must be recorded in the public records 
in order to have effects against third parties and detention of the 
declaration would not bestow any particular rights on the possessor. 
But, since the rights are incorporeal anyway, actual delivery is 
dispensed with under Civil Code article 3153.238 Such being the case, 
the declarant should create some kind of document evidencing his or 
her rights under the CCRs—such as an agreement for the collateral 
assignment and pledge of the rights under the CCRs—which would 
then be executed by the parties and retained by the lender.239 
                                                                                                             
 233. See id. art. 3152; see also In re Pleasant Hill Lumber Co., 52 So. 1010 (La. 
1910). But over time, courts overcame this obstacle in the law of pledge by stating 
that as long as the movable was initially transferred to the creditor, the creditor could 
then hand the property back to the debtor with the understanding that the debtor was 
holding it “in trust” on behalf of the creditor and that the security right remained in 
place. See Britton v. Harvey, 16 So. 747 (La. 1895). Evidence of this intent of the 
parties was typically accomplished through signing an agreement known as a “trust 
receipt.” See RUBIN, supra note 192, at 64. 
 234. See art. 3153; see also Liberty Farms, Inc. v. Miller, 45 So. 2d 610 (La. 
1950). 
 235. Caffin v. Kirkwan, 7 La. Ann. 221 (La. 1852). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Liberty Farms, 45 So. 2d at 615. 
 238. Art. 3153. 
 239. See id.; see also Liberty Farms, 45 So. 2d 610. While the need to create a 
physical symbol of the incorporeal movable right being pledged, as articulated in 
Liberty Farms, has arguably been substantially limited through the 1989 revision to 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3158, it is nonetheless advisable to include self-serving 
language in the collateral pledge agreement to ensure that the lender and the debtor 
are both acknowledging the lender’s quasi-possession of the incorporeal CCR rights 
through its possession of the physical document.  This confusion arises, in large 
part, due to missing Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4321, which was repealed 
in 2001 when UCC Article 9 was enacted and which dealt specifically with 
pledging incorporeal movable rights that are not evidenced by a written instrument.  
See Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Consol. Terminal Warehouses, Inc., 460 So. 2d 
663, 689 (La. Ct. App. 1984). Unlike promissory notes, bills of exchange, and the 
like, which are incorporeal rights evidenced by a writing, CCRs are rights that, 
although created through a written instrument, do not confer any rights upon the 
2014] SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR DECLARANTS 811 
 
 
 
While the use of the term “pledge” is still quite prevalent in 
Louisiana commercial transactions, it is merely the result of culture 
and custom, rather than any real use of the pledge articles.240 This is 
because in the 1990s, the Louisiana Legislature adopted UCC article 9, 
which almost completely superseded the articles on pledge.241 Today, 
with some narrow exceptions, the sole vehicle whereby one may grant 
a security interest in movable property is by following the rules of 
UCC article 9, which are laid out in chapter 9 of Title 10 of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes.242 Thus, any attempt to grant a security 
interest in movable property after January 1, 1990, must comport with 
the rules of UCC article 9, as the law of pledge of movables—with few 
exceptions—is largely no longer applicable.243 
Considering pledge’s lack of contemporary use and utility, one 
might wonder how it is implicated in the collateralization of a 
declaration of CCRs. Once again, the reason stems from the complex 
and multifaceted nature of the instrument itself. As indicated above, 
CCRs comprise a myriad of rights that are both considered movable 
and immovable.244 And, in some cases, it is difficult to tell whether a 
certain right is strictly movable or strictly immovable.245 For instance, 
the ability to appoint the members of the board of the association that 
governs the development would seem to be a contractual, personal 
right.246 However, one might also argue that because this right is 
incorporated into the declaration and so closely concerns the ability to 
exercise real rights over immovable property—i.e., increasing and 
collecting special assessments against the lots or units—that it could 
also be classified as a right in an immovable.247 
The law of mortgage is one of narrow construction, meaning that 
only those certain types of immovable property listed in the Civil Code 
                                                                                                             
 
holder of that written instrument.  Thus, the repeal of Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 9:4321 leaves a hole in the law as to how to perfect a proper pledge of an 
incorporeal movable when such a right is not evidenced by a writing. 
 240. See KILBORN, supra note 192, at 4. 
 241. RUBIN, supra note 192, at 61. 
 242. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. §§ 10:9-101 to -809 (2002). 
 243. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133.1 (2014) (“This Title shall apply to pledges of 
movables that are delivered prior to the time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial 
Laws becomes effective, including without limitation those pledges that may secure 
future obligations and lines of credit, as well as to pledges entered into on or after the 
time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes effective that are exempt 
or otherwise excluded from coverage thereunder.”). 
 244. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 245. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 246. See supra Part I.A–B and accompanying discussion. 
 247. See supra Part I.A–B. 
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may be encumbered by this type of security device.248 Movable 
property is specifically excluded from the law of mortgage.249 
However, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 10:9-109(d)(11) states 
that “[t]he creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property” 
is excluded from coverage under UCC article 9.250 In other words, the 
mixed nature of many of the rights in a declaration of CCRs might be 
too much like a right in a movable to be covered by the law of 
mortgage but too much like a right in an immovable to be covered by 
UCC article 9.251 This begs the question of whether some aspects of 
the CCRs fall into a sort of gap in Louisiana law whereby they cannot 
be encumbered by a consensual security device at all. In these cases, a 
shrewd lender’s counsel should adopt a belt and suspenders approach 
and attempt to utilize what is left of the law of pledge to ensure any 
additional rights are picked up that might be precluded from 
collateralization under the laws of mortgage and UCC article 9. 
Nevertheless, once a security right has been obtained in the 
CCRs—under any one or all of the aforementioned types of security 
devices available in Louisiana—the next important issue is 
determining what type of liability the lender subjects him or herself to 
upon foreclosure of his or her rights in the declaration. To what extent 
must the lender, now crowned declarant, pay for the sins and misdeeds 
of the original declarant? 
III. SUCCESSOR DECLARANTS AND LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA 
The question of successor liability for the lender, now turned 
declarant, is an issue that continues to vex Louisiana real estate 
lawyers. There is no direct statutory authority on point, and Louisiana 
courts have not yet created a jurisprudential solution. The source of this 
uncertainty likely arises out of the mixed nature of CCR 
declarations.252 As is often the criticism by common law 
commentators, these association regimes are held together by a 
concoction of the law of easements, building restrictions, and land 
covenants, as well as special homeowner and condominium association 
statutes.253 In Louisiana, each of these various legal principles has 
different rules and requirements that either specifically address the 
liability of successors or fail to lay out a particular framework for 
                                                                                                             
 248. See supra Part I.A. 
 249. See supra Part I.A. 
 250. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(d)(11) (Supp. 2014). 
 251. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 252. See Natelson, supra note 77, at 50–51. 
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liability altogether.254 As such, lenders and their attorneys are left with 
the question of whether to actually become the declarant after 
foreclosure because, despite the opportunity to have extensive legal 
control over the development, the potential for inherited liability is too 
great.255 Understanding the way in which liability passes—or does 
not—can be essential in determining what to do with collateral rights 
in the declaration upon a default. Choosing not to become the declarant 
can mean that the lender forfeits substantial authority and control over 
the quality, value, and continued maintenance of the overall 
development. 
A. Under Assignment and Assumption Principles 
Because the question of what regime or set of rules governs the 
liability of a lender who dons the mantle of the declarant remains 
unanswered, a review of several possibilities is in order. The first of 
these is the law of assignment and assumption of obligations, which is 
governed by Section 1 of Chapter 4, Title III of Book III of the 
Louisiana Civil Code: “Assumption of Obligations.”256 As a general 
rule, all obligations are transferable, unless they are strictly personal 
and therefore unable to be transferred.257 The Louisiana Civil Code 
provides a scheme for making this determination,258 but typically the 
rights and duties laid out in any declaration of CCRs will specifically 
state that the rights, duties, and obligations contained therein are freely 
assignable.259 And, even if such a statement is not so expressly made, it 
                                                                                                             
 254. See Uniform Condominium Act (1980), reprinted in UNIFORM REAL 
PROPERTY ACTS 7, 7–174 (1991); see also Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act 
(2008), reprinted in UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY ACTS 345, 345–556 (1991); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4 (2000). 
 255. See Oceanside Cmty. Ass’n v. Oceanside Land Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1983). 
 256. See LA. CIV. CODE, ch. 4, § 1, Title III of Book III (comprising LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 1821–24 (2014)). 
 257. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1765 (2014); see also SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS 
§ 4.1, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 55 (2d ed. 2001) (“The Louisiana Civil 
Code provides that every obligation is deemed heritable as to all parties, except when 
the contrary results from the terms or from the nature of the contract.”). 
 258. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, §§ 4.11–.15, at 58–66 (describing the various 
tests and situations under which an obligation is deemed strictly personal and thus 
insusceptible of being assigned or otherwise transferred). 
 259. Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Lockwood 
Folly, supra note 129, art. II, § 9 (“The Declarant may assign or pledge any or all of 
its rights reserved under the land use documents through an assignment or in an 
instrument of conveyance or assignment.” (emphasis added)); Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Wyncroft, supra note 129, art. 9 
(“Declarant shall have the right and power to assign and delegate to the respective 
associations, or any successor or successors thereto, at any time and from time to 
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is implied that such is the case because the developer will necessarily 
be transferring his or her rights in the declaration when authority and 
control is eventually ceded to the elected board of directors of the 
association.260  
If the lender, through a security device as set forth above, obtains 
the rights of the declarant, then he or she has in some sense been 
assigned those rights and has correspondingly assumed the 
responsibilities and benefits that go with them.261 Although Louisiana 
generally considers an assignment to include a transfer of title,262 
jurisprudence has also considered the granting of a security right under 
the auspices of the law of assignment.263 In terms of the transfer of 
debts, Louisiana law recognizes that as long as the “burden is not 
increased, rendering performance to one obligee or to another is 
relatively immaterial for the obligor, since he must perform 
anyway.”264 In this case, the lot or unit owners must perform—for 
instance, in the paying of regular assessments—vis-à-vis the declarant 
regardless of who occupies that position.265 And by the same token, it 
will likely not matter who is performing the declarant’s duties—such 
as regular maintenance of the development, ensuring the common 
areas are kept aesthetically pleasing, maintaining the facilities so they 
function properly etc.—as long as they are being done well and 
timely.266 There is an exception, of course, for when the obligee (i.e., 
the homeowner) is relying on some special skill of the obligor (i.e., the 
declarant) in performing such duties.267 But because the duties are 
typically outsourced to a third party (such as a property management 
company) and are, in fact, eventually turned over to the association’s 
elected board anyway, it is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby an 
                                                                                                             
 
time, all or any part of any of the rights, powers, and authority contained in this 
Declaration.” (emphasis added)). For an example of such a clause in Louisiana, see 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Segnette Estates, supra 
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 260. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 261. See generally TITLE, supra note 109, § 16:1, at 1484–85. 
 262. See Lusher v. Kilcrease, 384 So. 2d 589 (La. Ct. App. 1980); see also Dorvin 
Land Corp. v. Jefferson Parish, 469 So. 2d 1011 (La. Ct. App. 1985); White v. 
Gaines, No. 6455, 1877 WL 8158 (La. Nov. 1877). 
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Inc., 460 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 264. LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.3, at 226. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. 
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assignment would be prohibited.268 Moreover, because the declaration 
typically stipulates that all rights in the document are assignable, there 
is little question as to whether the owners’ consents must be 
obtained.269 
Two categories of assumptions are primarily discussed by 
obligations commentators.270 The first occurs when the obligee and a 
third party agree that the third party will perform on behalf of the 
obligor.271 This scenario is inapplicable to the declarant–lender 
relationship described here as far as successor declarants are 
concerned. The second and more relevant assumption occurs when an 
obligor and a third party agree that the third party will assume the 
obligations that the obligor owes to the obligee.272 Under such a 
scenario, the obligee’s consent is not necessary (although the obligee 
may still give it) to make the agreement effective between the 
parties.273 Regardless of whether or not consent is given, both the third 
party and the original obligor are liable for the performance to the 
obligee.274 So of course, in our developer–declarant situation, the 
lender is the third party and the obligor is the declarant who owes 
various obligations to the owners under the declaration.275 By taking a 
security interest in the declaration, one might characterize the transfer 
that occurs when the lender exercises its rights and becomes the 
declarant itself as being a sort of transfer and assumption of the 
developer’s rights under the declaration.276 However, Louisiana law 
does not require that the owners (the obligees to whom performance is 
due) consent to the transfer.277 Such being the case, the lender (now the 
declarant) and the developer (the original obligor) are both liable to the 
owners for whatever obligations are owed under the declaration.278  
As is evident from the nature of CCR declarations, the declarant is 
both an obligee and an obligor.279 He or she both owes duties to the 
owners (regular maintenance and repair of the development and its 
facilities and common areas) and is owed duties by them in return (the 
timely payment of assessments, adherence to the rules and regulations 
                                                                                                             
 268. See id. 
 269. See supra note 129. 
 270. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1821, 1823 (2014); see also LITVINOFF, supra note 
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 272. See id. art. 1821. 
 273. LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.12, at 229. 
 274. Id. §§ 10.13–.14, at 230–31. 
 275. See supra Part I.A and accompanying discussion. 
 276. See supra Part II and accompanying discussion. 
 277. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.11, at 229. 
 278. See id. §§ 10.13–.14, at 230–31. 
 279. See supra Part I.A. 
816 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
of the development, etc.).280 The same duality of roles is true with 
respect to the owners as well.281 Because the declaration is a form of 
bilateral or synallagmatic contract, whereby both parties (the declarant 
and the owners) may demand performance and owe performance 
reciprocally, both the active and the passive aspects of the agreement are 
transferred.282 The assignment of such a complex agreement is 
recognized under Louisiana law, and by effecting such a transfer, the 
third party (the lender in this case) becomes the recipient of the 
performance owed by the owner and responsible for the obligations 
owed by the declarant.283 
Thus, once the assignment is completed and the lender exercises its 
rights as the assignee under the declaration, there is a question of 
liability. Under the general theories of assumption, the assignee is 
responsible for all of the rights and duties of the assignor.284 Whatever 
obligations are due by the developer as the original declarant would be 
due by the lender as the successor declarant.285 Louisiana 
commentators often state that, similar to subrogation (assumption’s 
cousin institution), the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor for 
all purposes such that it occupies the very place in every respect as the 
one that it succeeded.286 The jurisprudence bears this out in practice.287 
                                                                                                             
 280. See supra Part I.A–B and accompanying discussion. 
 281. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1908 (2014) (“A contract is bilateral, or 
synallagmatic, when the parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the 
obligation of each party is correlative to the obligation of the other.”). 
 282. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.34, at 241–42. 
 283. See id. (“The inter vivos transfer of both the active and the passive side of an 
obligation, that is, the assignment of a credit-right on the one hand and the 
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rendered by that person, and may also assign to that person his right to receive the 
return performance. When such is the situation, the third person assumes the 
obligation of which one of the parties to the contract is obligor, and also becomes 
assignee, or transferee, of the credit-right which that party has as obligee.”). 
 284. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.3, at 226–27. 
 285. See id. 
 286. See id. § 11.33, at 260 (“Aside from those differences, the rights acquired by 
an assignee and a subrogee are indeed the same. Both acquire, besides the principal 
right to demand performance from an obligor, any accessory rights that may 
accompany the principal right, including not only suretyship, as recognized by 
traditional law, but also the right of preference arising from mortgage, pledge or 
privilege. In the case of assignment of a credit-right, the wide range of accessory 
rights that may be acquired by the assignee is clearly stated in an article of the 
Louisiana Civil Code.”); see also Dardar v. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 556 So. 2d 272 (La. Ct. 
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In Hardy v. Whitney,288 the court held that when a third party assumes 
the obligation to make repayment of the loan of another, he or she 
essentially “assume[s] whatever obligation was owed.”289 Similarly, 
the court in McCrory v. Terminix Service Co., Inc. stated that when a 
contract is assumed under Civil Code article 1821, the assignee 
becomes bound entirely by its terms and “cannot be given relief merely 
because they assumed a bad and/or outdated bargain.”290 And the 
jurisprudence is replete with cases between assignees of mineral leases 
and their assignors arguing over the contractual language in assignment 
and assumption clauses as to whether the full force of Civil Code 
article 1821 has effected a complete transfer of all rights and 
obligations—including those involving remedial obligations for 
abandoned wells.291 
If the lender–declarant’s successor liability is characterized under 
the Louisiana Civil Code’s framework for assignment and assumption 
of obligations, then the liability for past bad acts and breaches by the 
developer as the declarant would pass automatically to the lender.292 
The lender, upon becoming declarant, would step into the shoes of the 
developer for all intents and purposes to the extent of the obligations 
and duties that are articulated and imposed in the declaration.293 
Because the assumption of liability rules are so absolute, there would 
be little way for the lender to avoid liability, unless it had specifically, 
contractually limited itself in the security agreement with the developer 
at the onset. By agreeing to only assume certain rights and duties of the 
developer upon taking control as the new declarant, the lender would 
therefore be able—under the Civil Code article 1821 jurisprudence—to 
cherry-pick and limit its liabilities as successor under the 
declaration.294 Under this theory, the lender could essentially insulate 
itself from certain liabilities, but this, of course, assumes that the 
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obligations under the declaration are appropriately classified as being 
completely contractual in nature. As discussed below, many aspects of 
the CCRs are, in fact, closely tied to real rights that are governed by a 
wholly different regime. 
B. Under Servitudes and Building Restrictions 
The question of liability as to successors-in-title to property that is 
burdened by a predial servitude or building restriction raises interesting 
questions. As a general matter, the obligations that are imposed by 
building restrictions, such as those that comprise CCR declarations, run 
with the land.295 For some time, there was debate among Louisiana 
courts and commentators as to whether these obligations were personal 
obligations of the property owners that were consented to when the 
property was first purchased or if they were purely the result of real 
obligations.296 The Louisiana Supreme Court finally clarified this point 
in Brier Lake, Inc. v. Jones, holding that the obligations imposed in 
CCR declarations were to be classified solely as real obligations on the 
parcels, not personal obligations of the individual owners.297 In this 
same vein, referring to both building restrictions and servitudes, 
Professor Yiannopoulos further expounded that “the holder of a real 
right may abandon it by a unilateral act. Abandonment enables the 
holder of a real right to avoid obligations and charges attached to a 
thing.”298 Therefore, the liability of one who owes an obligation that 
derives from a real right may dispense with his or her duties by merely 
transferring the immovable to another.299 
Thus, in viewing the issues of successor liability for declarants 
through the lens of building restrictions and servitudes, the successor 
declarant would seem to take on all the duties and liabilities of its 
predecessor.300 Because the obligation is derived purely from its 
association with the land—rather than with the individual owner—the 
transfer of the property would unavoidably transfer the obligation and 
                                                                                                             
 295. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 195, at 523. 
 296. See Mariner’s Vill. Master Ass’n, Inc. v. Cont’l Props., 639 So. 2d 1188, 
1193 (La. Ct. App. 1994); see also Vill. Square Shopping Ctr. Ass’n v. Nelson, 522 
So. 2d 163 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
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Restrictions requiring the affirmative duty of paying assessments, not to exceed 
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restriction and is subject to the two-year prescriptive period of La. C.C. art. 775 and is 
not a personal obligation under La. C.C. art. 3499. To the extent that Mariner’s 
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any past failures to perform the obligation that accompanied it.301 
Therefore, it necessarily follows that it would be impossible to separate 
the liability for nonperformance of a real obligation from the real 
obligation itself.302 To do so would undermine the very idea that the 
duties that are attendant upon holders of immovable property subject to a 
real obligation are not the personal obligations of the owner.303 If such is 
the case, then the lender who assumes the role of declarant necessarily 
assumes the obligations of the original declarant who failed to 
perform.304 Because the duties, both affirmative and negative—which 
are comprised chiefly of building restrictions and servitudes—are real 
obligations that are imposed upon the entire development, then any 
subsequent transfer of the development would necessarily effect a 
transfer of those rights and duties.305 And the developer (as the original 
declarant) is able to “avoid obligations and charges attached to” the 
property by transferring it to another.306 This result seems harsh but 
would be consistent with the general principles governing the transfer of 
immovable property subject to a real obligation in Louisiana. 
A look to the common law is instructive in this area. Interestingly, 
the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Property (Servitudes) provides 
some direct guidance as to successors of covenants and servitudes, 
which are utilized in a comprehensive common interest community 
declaration.307 Section 4.4(1) states that: 
An original party or successor to a servitude burden that runs 
with an interest in property incurs liability on account of the 
servitude burden only for obligations that accrue during the time 
the party or successor holds the burdened property interest.308  
The comments to the provision explain that the liabilities of a 
successor to a servitude are limited to only those that arise during the 
time the successor holds the servitude.309 Any obligations that might 
have accrued prior to the transfer are not applicable to the successor.310 
The example given in the comments illustrates how a transferor is 
liable to pay assessments levied against the property pursuant to a 
                                                                                                             
 301. Id. 
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 307. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4 (2000). 
 308. Id. § 4.4(1). 
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neighborhood declaration up to the date of the transfer.311 The 
transferee is only liable for assessments after the date of transfer and 
not for prior unpaid assessments accruing before the transfer.312 Thus, 
the general rules set forth in the Restatement would suggest that the 
successor declarant is not liable for the past, unfilled obligations of its 
predecessor declarant, such that the lender could exercise its security 
rights without fear of being forced to pay for the sins of the developer. 
However, the guidance from the Restatement regarding affirmative 
obligations, and breaches thereof, with regard to successors is a bit 
more complex.313 In general, common law courts have imposed 
declaration obligations that are of a continuing nature upon a 
successor.314 For instance, if the declaration states that the declarant is 
responsible for maintaining the community golf course, a successor 
declarant will be held liable for this continued obligation of 
maintenance and repair.315 However, Restatement section 4.4(3) 
describes a more nuanced, contract-based carve-out to this general rule 
for successor liabilities in stating that “[t]he duration of any person’s 
liability to perform a servitude burden in gross is determined according 
to the rules governing liability to perform contractual obligations.”316 
As such, common law courts have further elaborated on this contract-
based exception.317 If a developer was bound in the declaration under 
contract (rather than in property) to construct certain common facilities 
but neglected to do so, he or she would nonetheless continue to be 
responsible for fulfilling this obligation even after his or her rights as 
declarant had been transferred to another party.318 Thus, if the 
declarant failed to construct the community pool as dictated by the 
declaration and subsequently transferred his or her rights under the 
declaration to another, the successor might be relieved by a court from 
                                                                                                             
 311. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4(1) cmt. b (2000). 
 312. See id. The comments do, however, indicate that “parties to covenants may, 
of course, create obligations that will continue to bind the covenantor after transfer of 
the property, subject to the limitations imposed by Chapter 3 [] on restraints on 
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 313. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4(3) (2000). 
 314. Oceanside Cmty. Ass’n v. Oceanside Land Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1983) (“Generally, after the covenantor transfers the land and his or her 
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 315. Id. 
 316. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4(3) (2000). 
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1980). 
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having to construct the pool because of the original contractual 
obligation of the developer to complete said construction.319 
Under this line of cases, the question of successor liability for 
affirmative obligations to construct common areas might be a bit more 
uncertain. If the developer–declarant’s obligations could be classified 
as purely contractual in nature, then the duty to construct these 
common facilities or improvements would remain with him or her, 
despite a third party having become the declarant.320 But, if the duty 
was recognized as merely a continuing obligation of the declarant 
under the declaration, then it would be more akin to an obligation 
arising from a covenant and therefore transfer to the successor with the 
property itself.321 Still, some states have specifically legislated with 
respect to the issue, such as section 1466 of the California Civil Code, 
which provides that “[n]o one, merely by reason of having acquired an 
estate subject to a covenant running with the land, is liable for a breach 
of the covenant before he acquired the estate, or after he has parted 
with it or ceased to enjoy its benefits.”322 
It is possible that Louisiana courts might similarly distinguish a 
duty in a declaration that derives from contract principles from one that 
is derived from real obligations in limiting a successor declarant’s 
liability. However, such a distinction would likely be born from the 
specific facts and circumstances of each case (and the dictates of 
equity) rather than from any firm rules.323 Such a shifting, fact-based 
framework greatly diminishes the ability of the successor declarant to 
accurately weigh and balance its potential liabilities with any certainty 
because the characterization of the various rights under the declaration 
would be left to the discretion of the courts. 
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C. Under Corporate Law Theories 
Another theory under which the question of successor liability for 
lenders who become declarants might be resolved stems from theories 
of corporate law.324 The general rule of American corporate law is that 
when one legal entity sells or otherwise transfers its property to another 
legal entity, the assets are transferred free and clear, except for any 
valid and preexisting security rights or liens.325 However, exceptions 
have been made over time to help blunt the harsh and unfair results that 
can come from a strict application of this general principle.326 
Sometimes these exceptions came from legislative acts, and other 
times they sprang from the equitable powers of the courts.327 Although 
generally derived from similar theories that aim to pierce through the 
corporate structure when justice so requires, some lawyers and 
commentators have argued that the exception theories to successor 
liability arise under tort law principles as well.328 
Louisiana courts have taken a particularly amorphous view with 
regard to successor liability, often rejecting the notion of adopting a 
uniform or “ultimate test of successor firm liability.”329 However, they 
have generally followed much of the same analysis on certain instances 
of successor liability as common law courts.330 The first scenario for 
successor liability in Louisiana, and often the easiest to understand, 
involves the express or implied assumption of liabilities.331 In this case, 
Louisiana courts have looked to whether the facts of the parties, 
specifically the successor, evidence an intent to assume the obligations 
of the transferor.332 The justification behind this theory is to look to the 
business negotiations between the parties and respect their allocation of 
transferred responsibilities.333 Under the successor declarant scenario, 
it might be difficult to discern whether the borrower and the lender 
ever really came to an agreement as to the liability between them 
should the lender become the declarant because the anticipation of both 
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parties, at least at the onset, is that there would never be a default and 
the loan would be paid in full.334 Nonetheless, perhaps the use of this 
theory would suggest that the lender and the borrower could agree in 
the collateral security documents that should the lender become the 
declarant, all liability for preexisting acts should remain with the 
borrower.335 In such a case, this theory of corporate-successor liability 
would suggest that the court would respect the agreement between the 
parties.336 However, the agreement of the parties as to the allocation of 
risks might leave all liabilities with a defunct corporation and thereby 
cause great inequity to third-party claimants. As such, Louisiana courts 
have been reluctant to fully endorse this theory of successor liability, 
preferring to distinguish the facts of each case to provide a course of 
redress that is fair to third parties.337 
Fraud is at the core of Louisiana’s second theory of successor 
liability.338 This theory is typically seen in the creditor-fraud scenario 
whereby a debtor–corporation transfers certain valuable assets—which 
would otherwise be the common pledge of its creditors—to a separate 
but affiliated corporation.339 By doing so, the debtor–corporation hopes 
to remove the assets from possible seizure by its creditors.340 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Wolff v. Shreveport Gas that it 
would attach the ancestor’s liability to the successor when a transfer of 
assets was made to perpetuate fraud.341 But, the creditor-fraud theory is 
less applicable to the lender turned declarant scenario. The borrower–
developer is not attempting to transfer its powers under the declaration 
to escape its responsibilities to the association members.342 Rather, 
power is being unwillingly wrenched from it by its creditor because of 
its failure to pay the loan.343 Because the transfer is involuntary on the 
part of the transferor, it is doubtful that this fraud-based theory would 
                                                                                                             
 334. See generally id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See Kuney, supra note 324, at 173; see also TLC Novelty Co., Inc. v. 
Perino’s Inc., 881 So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Morrison v. C.A. Guidry 
Produce, 856 So. 2d 1222 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Central Bus. Forms Inc. v. N-Sure 
Sys. Inc. 540 So. 2d 1029 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
 338. See Kuney, supra note 324, at 173; see also Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, 
LLC, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 509 (Mass. 2005) (discussing the causation requirements 
involved in this theory). 
 339. Kuney, supra note 324, at 173. 
 340. Id. 
 341. 70 So. 789 (La. 1916). 
 342. See supra Part I.C and accompanying discussion. 
 343. See supra Part I.C and accompanying discussion. 
824 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
play a part in imposing liability under the declaration upon the 
lender.344 
The last theory under which Louisiana courts have imposed 
successor liability in abrogation of the general rule against it involves 
de facto mergers.345 The main aspects of this theory were also 
annunciated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wolff v. Shreveport 
Gas.346 This theory can arise in any of four scenarios.347 The first 
involves multiple corporations ceasing to exist, with only one new 
entity left at the end.348 The second involves a situation whereby “one 
of the corporate parties ceases to exist while the other continues.”349 
The third involves a new corporation that, although not formally, is, in 
reality, “the reincarnation of the old one.”350 And lastly, the fourth 
involves a shell corporation that, although it continues to exist, has in 
fact merged with another entity that has acquired all of its assets and 
business.351 In each of these scenarios, it is difficult to see how a 
lender–declarant would be imposed with liability, unless the borrower 
and the lender were affiliate companies or the borrower was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the lender.352 If such were the case, then the 
doctrine of continuation of corporate existence that was articulated in 
Wolff and its progeny would seem to apply.353 
In reviewing all of the possible theories under which Louisiana 
courts impose successor liability, it seems likely that the declarant–
lender could only fall into the first category.354 In such a case, it would 
be incumbent upon the lender to ensure that it does not contract with 
the borrower so as to suggest that it will assume past obligations and 
liabilities under the declaration.355 Nevertheless, it should be 
remembered that the doctrine of successor liability in corporate law is 
an equitable one, meant to provide fairness to the parties when justice 
demands that liability transfer to a successor.356 It is not difficult to 
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imagine that a court, when faced with claims by association members 
for unfulfilled obligations of the declarant, might turn away from the 
broke and financially distressed developer and to the resource-rich and 
capable lender to provide relief.357 As with all doctrines that are born 
out of equity, the lack of clear rules and guidelines makes predictability 
difficult.358 
IV. FAIRNESS AND FLEXIBILITY: CRITIQUES AND A PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
Louisiana law presents a variety of possible theories, but no 
definitive answers, as to the issue of successor liability for lenders 
turned declarants.359 Louisiana law provides a relatively small menu of 
options for courts to use in dealing with these complicated lender–
borrower–third-party-owner transactions.360 In trying to balance the 
rights of the parties and provide the most fair and market-efficient 
solution, courts have very few doctrines with which to wield and none 
are squarely on point.361 
A. A Critique of State Doctrinal Possibilities 
While all or any one of the concepts and doctrines offered above 
could arguably be used to fill the gaps in determining liability for 
lenders turned declarants, they all come with their own unique set of 
limitations and complications.362 First, because it is the granting of a 
security interest in the declaration that allows the lender to become the 
declarant, it arguably makes sense to use assignment and assumption 
concepts to determine the liability of a successor declarant.363 
However, this analysis presents its own set of problems because an 
absolute application of the rules of assignment and assumption could 
variously create too great a burden on the lender in being subject to the 
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past misdeeds of the borrower or too little accountability on the new 
declarant vis-à-vis the unit or lot owners.364 
Alternatively, because servitudes and building restrictions are so 
intimately bound up in the common interest community concept—
whether used in an apartment building, a commercial office/retail 
development, or a residential subdivision—it seems persuasive to 
analyze successor liability under Louisiana’s property-oriented 
principles.365 However, these frameworks are fairly broad and would 
seem to absolutely transfer the real obligations (including obligations 
arising from nonperformance) to the successor owner, without regard 
to the culpability of the prior owner.366 And while the Restatement of 
Property (Servitudes) provides a more nuanced approach that 
contemplates the timing and nature of real obligations arising from the 
owner of land vis-à-vis owners in a chain of title, this approach has not 
been adopted in Louisiana.367 Further, the Restatement’s contract 
versus real rights distinction is inconsistent and lacks the level of 
clarity that would be needed to truly create a reliable resolution to the 
issue of successor declarant liability.368 
Lastly, corporate law’s varied scheme for successor liability 
provides a fairly nuanced construction that could serve as a guidepost 
in helping to determine the question of successor liability.369 However, 
the jurisprudence that directs and informs corporate successor liability 
is distinctly different from the facts and circumstances of most lender 
collateral take-over scenarios. In addressing the issue of lender liability 
for declarants, Louisiana will likely employ various portions of the 
laws of assignment, assumption, servitudes, building restrictions, and 
corporate successor liability to craft a fair and suitable remedy.370 The 
question that arises, however, is to what extent any of these theories, 
even when combined or amalgamated with one another, can provide 
the necessary tools to craft a remedy that comports with the need to 
limit liability in order for the real estate financing market to operate 
efficiently but also provides the protections deserved by the unit or lot 
owners when a prior declarant has caused them to suffer a loss.371 
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 368. See supra Part III.B. 
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B. The Community Regime Approach 
Despite their individual deficiencies, the theories offered above372 
share one common flaw: none are meant to deal with the very detailed, 
sophisticated, and complex nature of common-interest developments.373 
The beauty—as well as the complexity—of these developments, which 
comprise such an assortment of parties, uses, purposes, and functions, is 
that they are only made possible by a combination of elements from all 
of these assorted legal regimes.374 The transferability and assignment of 
rights help provide a structure to facilitate the necessary financing that 
makes the construction and operation of the project possible.375 
Principles of real charges on property in the form of servitudes and 
building restrictions provide mechanisms to enforce standards of quality 
and infuse the declaration with functionality and authority.376 And 
finally, the interposition of corporate and business entity constructs 
make continuing governance and order possible for the duration of the 
development’s life.377 
However, the issue of successor liability for declarants is a very 
specific and idiosyncratic problem that is particular to these types of 
developments where the parties bind themselves to a government-style 
private structure of rights and duties to acquire, maintain, and develop 
their common-ownership interests in the property.378 The complex 
arrangement of these parties—the owners, the developer, and the 
lender—does not neatly fit into any of the above legal regimes. In 
order to address such a nuanced issue born out of such a complex and 
multifaceted legal framework, only a comprehensive legislative 
enactment that is specifically geared toward these types of 
developments can effectively address the issue.379 
1. Deficiencies in Current Statutory Frameworks 
Louisiana has adopted a comprehensive framework for at least two 
different types of common interest communities.380 The first is the 
Louisiana Condominium Act (LCA), which was first enacted as the 
Horizontal Property Act of 1962 but was amended, renamed, and 
                                                                                                             
 372. See supra Part III.A–C. 
 373. See supra Part III.A–C. 
 374. See supra Part III.A–C; see also supra Part I.A–C and accompanying 
discussion. 
 375. See supra Part III.A. 
 376. See supra Part III.B. 
 377. See supra Part III.C. 
 378. See supra Part I.A–C and accompanying discussion. 
 379. See generally supra Part I.A–C. 
 380. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 144, at 334–35. 
828 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
reenacted in both 1974 and again in 1979.381 While the general rules of 
ownership in the Louisiana Civil Code do not recognize or allow such 
a system of ownership of vertical units and co-ownership of common 
elements in the way that condominiums are contemporarily thought of, 
the LCA provides a special legal regime that supplements the 
Louisiana Civil Code and allows for such a structure.382 
The other common interest community system that has been 
specifically codified in Louisiana is the Louisiana Homeowners 
Association Act (LHOA).383 Much like the LCA, the LHOA allows for 
the establishment of a single, comprehensive legal regime that is given 
the power—through a combination of corporate law, building 
restrictions, and servitudes—to provide and maintain uniform and 
quality standards for the grounds, buildings, and improvements within 
a residential subdivision.384 Both statutes allow for, among other 
things, the creation of an association to govern the community, the 
ability to dictate aesthetic and other property standards to maintain the 
quality of the development, and the power to impose fees that 
constitute liens against the property that support the costs and expenses 
of maintenance and repair.385 
However, despite their many useful qualities, neither the LCA nor 
the LHOA address the duties and responsibilities of lenders who step 
into the shoes of the declarant vis-à-vis the unit or lot owners within 
the common interest community.386 The LHOA defines a declaration 
as “any instrument, however denominated, that establishes or regulates, 
or both, a residential planned community, and any amendment thereto” 
but does not elaborate any further as to its effects or the transfer or the 
rights under it.387 Similarly, the LCA actually mentions the declarant 
and imposes on the declarant a duty to collect two months’ worth of 
assessments at the time of the initial sale of the units in order to build 
up an association reserve but goes no further to address the potential 
                                                                                                             
 381. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1121.101 (2008). 
 382. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 144, at 334–35. (“Like its predecessor, the 
Condominium Act of 1979 is a statute of limited scope, ancillary to the Civil Code. 
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against the background of the Louisiana civilian tradition and in harmony with it. 
Matters not directly determined by the act will be resolved by application of the 
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subjected to a condominium regime by the appropriate declaration.”). See also Tyler 
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Louisiana Condominium Act, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 209 (2010). 
 383. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1141.1–.9 (2008). 
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 385. See id. 
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liabilities once he or she is no longer the declarant.388 In essence, 
Louisiana’s only two statutes that are directly related to the creation 
and governance of common interest communities are completely 
devoid of any guidance as to what rights and duties a successor inherits 
when he or she dons the mantle of the declarant.389 Although Louisiana 
has not ventured down the path of creating a single, comprehensive 
common interest community statute that addresses, among other 
things, successor liability for declarants, various model and uniform 
acts dealing specifically with such developments offer several viable 
options. 
2. The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act 
Model and uniform acts often serve as guideposts to Louisiana 
courts in looking to fill gaps in the law.390 In many instances, the 
Louisiana Legislature has adopted—either wholesale or merely in 
part—various model or uniform acts as part of an ongoing effort to 
modernize and improve state law in a given area.391 The Model 
Business Corporation Act,392 the Model Execution of Wills Act,393 
various articles from the Uniform Commercial Code,394 and the Model 
Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse Neglect395 are 
just a few of the uniform acts that have been used in furthering efforts 
to provide more efficiency in the law and to harmonize Louisiana law 
with the law of other states.396  
And while model and uniform acts can and are promulgated by a 
variety of groups across the country and around the globe, a 
                                                                                                             
 388. Id. § 9:1121.101. 
 389. Id.; id. § 9:1141.1–.9. 
 390. See Christopher K. Odinet, The Anchor Effect—Contemporary Legal Reform, 
the Civil Law Tradition, and Changing Expectations, 88 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
Spring 2014). 
 391. See id. 
 392. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:286 (2008). The editor’s comment notes: 
“This section is derived from the more extensive provisions on indemnification 
contained in the 1983 Revised Model Business Corporation Act.” Id. 
 393. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2401, editor’s note (2005) (“This section was 
based upon the ‘Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, of 1910’ which was declared 
obsolete when its provisions were incorporated in and covered by § 7 of the ‘Model 
Execution of Wills Act, of 1940.’ The latter act has not been adopted by the 
legislature, but its improved language was tracked in this Section.”). 
 394. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to -109, :3-101 to -807, :4-101 to -504, 
:4a-101 to -507, :5-101 to -118, :7-101 to -701, :8-101 to -511 (2003); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 9-101 to -809 (2002). 
 395. See LA. CHILD. CODE art. 679 cmt. b (2014) (“These changes are consistent 
with the A.B.A. Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse 
Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings adopted in August, 2011.”). 
 396. See generally Odinet, supra note 390. 
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particularly influential organization that has made a substantial impact 
in the ongoing effort to harmonize the various laws in the United States 
is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(ULC).397 Among the areas of the law given treatment by the ULC 
include efforts to deal with real estate collective or associated type 
communities.398 Its first efforts resulted in the Uniform Condominium 
Act of 1977, the Uniform Planned Community Act of 1980, and the 
Model Real Estate Cooperative Act of 1981.399 But there was a general 
desire to combine these various related and similar legal regimes into 
one model act.400 This desire resulted in the 1982 promulgation of the 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA).401 The UCIOA 
was meant to supplant and take the place of the three prior acts by 
creating a comprehensive framework for all common-interest 
ownership regimes, which would be able to contemplate the legal 
needs and desires of those building, working, and living in 
condominiums, cooperative developments, and other types of planned 
communities.402  
In order to fulfill these omnibus goals, the UCIOA was drafted to 
be both wide-ranging and all-inclusive such that it covers everything 
from the creation of the common interest real estate community, to the 
management and proper administration of the development, all the way 
to the termination, in whole or in part, of the entire regime.403 And—
because real estate transactions have taken on a greater complexity 
over time—the UCIOA also provides a prophylactic framework of 
disclosures, warranties, buyer’s rights, and other consumer 
protections.404  
                                                                                                             
 397. See generally Henry D. Gabriel, The Revisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code—Process and Politics, 19 J.L. & COM. 125, 126 (1999). 
 398. See generally Robert Kratovil, The Declaration of Restrictions, Easements, 
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Commercial Common Interest Community—Choices under the Uniform Condominium 
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a. Liability for Original Declarants Under the UCIOA 
Interestingly, the UCIOA provides very specific guidance as to 
successor liability for declarants.405 In fact, not only does the UCIOA 
contain provisions that are specifically on point, it contains a rather 
intricate framework that attempts to balance the rights of the innocent 
successor declarant and the rights of the injured lot or unit owners who 
have suffered a loss.406 Specifically, section 3–104 of the UCIOA 
provides for the effects of the transfer of declarant rights.407 The 
section states that when a declarant has transferred rights under the 
declaration, the declarant’s liability is as follows: 
(1) A transferor is not relieved of any obligation or liability 
arising before the transfer and remains liable for warranty 
obligations imposed upon him by this [act]. Lack of privity 
does not deprive any unit owner of standing to maintain an 
action to enforce any obligation of the transferor. 
(2) If a successor to any special declarant right is an affiliate of 
a declarant[], the transferor is jointly and severally liable with 
the successor for any obligations or liabilities of the successor 
relating to the common interest community. 
(3) If a transferor retains any special declarant rights, but 
transfers other special declarant rights to a successor who is not 
an affiliate of the declarant, the transferor is liable for any 
obligations or liabilities imposed on a declarant by this [act] or 
by the declaration relating to the retained special declarant 
rights and arising after the transfer. 
(4) A transferor has no liability for any act or omission or any 
breach of a contractual or warranty obligation arising from the 
exercise of a special declarant right by a successor declarant 
who is not an affiliate of the transferor.408 
Thus, under this regime, the developer, as the original declarant, is 
not off the hook for his or her own bad acts or failure to fulfill 
obligations.409 Specifically, the UCIOA provides that liability remains 
with the developer for those obligations and duties that arose under his 
or her reign as declarant and continue even when the declarant powers 
have been placed into the hands of another.410 
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b. Liability for Successor Declarants Under the UCIOA 
However, section 3–104 further stipulates, in pertinent part, 
explicitly what liabilities a successor declarant, such as a lender who 
forecloses on its security rights in the declaration, incurs.411 Generally, 
all successor declarants are subject to the obligations and liabilities 
imposed by the UCIOA or the declaration, but, importantly, they are 
not subject to liabilities that might arise out of  
(A) Misrepresentations by any previous declarant; 
(B) Warranty obligations on improvements made by any 
previous declarant, or made before the common interest 
community was created; 
(C) Breach of any fiduciary obligation by any previous 
declarant or his appointees to the executive board; or 
(D) Any liability or obligation imposed on the transferor as a 
result of the transferor’s acts or omissions after the 
transfer.412 
Here, the UCIOA’s framework contemplates the exact scenario 
involving Realty Bank, Developer A, and Bluebell Lane discussed in 
the introduction above as to what position a lender is placed when it 
dons the mantle of the declarant.413 The risk and uncertainty that 
faces the lender in determining whether to foreclose on the 
declaration is made explicit and certain by the dictates of the 
statute.414 
                                                                                                             
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. See also id. cmt. 1 (“This section deals with the issue of the extent to 
which obligations and liabilities imposed upon a declarant by this Act are transferred 
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provisions of this section. In the event of a foreclosure, sale by a trustee under a deed 
of trust, or sale by a trustee in bankruptcy of all units owned by a declarant, if the 
transferee of such units does not request the transfer of special declarant rights then, 
under subsection (d), those special declarant rights cease to exist and any period of 
declarant control terminates.”). 
 414. Id. § 3–104. 
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In attempting to protect the interests of the unit or lot owners, the 
lender must take on all duties and responsibilities that are imposed 
upon the declarant under the law and the declaration.415 However, the 
lender is not subjected to those responsibilities that arise from any 
fraud that was perpetuated by the developer such as misrepresentations 
regarding the quality of certain improvements and amenities in the 
development.416 Nor is the lender responsible for special obligations of 
warranty or the breach of the developer’s fiduciary duties when it was 
in control of the association—such as the misappropriation of 
association funds or malfeasance in management of the 
development.417 
And lastly, the UCIOA provides a special rule for lenders who both 
purchase the property at foreclosure sale and take on the mantle of the 
declarant but only intend to hold these rights for an interim time period 
until a willing buyer can be identified.418 During this interim holding 
period, the lender is strictly and narrowly limited in its ability to 
exercise rights under the declaration, but, in return for this limitation, is 
exempted from any and all liability under the declaration except for its 
own bad acts.419 This last provision “permits a foreclosing lender to 
undertake such a transaction without incurring the full burden of 
declarant obligations and liabilities.”420 Of course, these lender-
friendly rights are balanced against the “need for continuing operation 
of the association and, to that end, permit[] a foreclosing lender to 
assume control of the association for the purpose of ensuring a smooth 
transition” to a subsequent buyer.421 
As the editor’s comments to section 3–103 so clearly set forth, the 
UCIOA strives to balance “what obligations and liabilities to unit 
owners (both existing and future) a declarant should retain” with “what 
obligations and liabilities may fairly be imposed upon the 
declarant’s successor in interest.”422 In doing so, the UCIOA addresses 
the important question of what happens to a lender who takes a 
security interest in a declaration to protect its collateral but faces the 
risk of being subjected to open-ended liability.423 In answering this 
question, the UCIOA subjects the original declarant to “continuing 
obligations and liabilities for promises, acts, or omissions undertaken 
during the period that he was in control of the community,” while at 
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the same time releasing that same original declarant from 
“responsibilities with respect to the promises, acts, or omissions of a 
successor over whom he has no control.”424 The new successor incurs 
obligations to the unit or lot owners for which it can accurately assess 
and plan for and be relieved of the phantom of liability for unknown 
liabilities arising from the acts of its predecessor.425 
3. A Call for Reform 
In addressing the issue of successor liability for declarants, 
Louisiana has no direct statutory or jurisprudential authority from 
which to draw a definitive conclusion.426 Also, of the several sources 
of state law that can be drawn from, none provide Louisiana courts 
with the precise tools that they need to craft an inclusive jurisprudential 
remedy.427 Each legal regime described above, in combination with the 
others, plays an integral part in the common-interest ownership regime, 
but none can be joined in such a way as to address the issue of what to 
do with the rights and duties of third parties who step into the shoes of 
the declarant.428 
The issue of successor liability for declarants in common interest 
communities is not an easy one.429 It involves the intersection of very 
important but very opposed interests.430 On the one hand, the unit or lot 
owners must be protected from the malfeasance or breach of the 
declarant’s responsibilities by having a party against which they can 
seek recourse.431 Further, to ensure that the new declarant (the lender) 
has sufficient buy-in and commitment to the development, a certain 
level of liability and responsibility must be imposed upon the declarant 
to give him or her some skin in the game.432 All the while, however, 
any resolution of the issue must ensure that reliable and risk-assessable 
security rights are available to parties that lend the money and make 
the investments that cause the many successful common interest 
communities across the country to be possible.433 
What Louisiana needs is a comprehensive framework that can 
address all of the specific and complex scenarios that often arise in 
common interest communities, and the UCIOA provides many key 
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provisions that can be used in crafting such a statute.434 The UCIOA 
ensures that the original declarant is not relieved of liability for the 
original promises that he or she had made and the obligations that he or 
she had undertaken, while at the same time imposes upon the lender 
enough responsibility that it will feel that it has sufficient legal 
responsibilities to warrant careful and prudent administration of the 
development.435 And lastly, to effectuate an efficient transition of the 
property into the hands of a more permanent owner, the UCIOA allows 
the successor declarant to surrender some of its rights under the 
declaration for an interim period in exchange for a waiver of most 
liabilities.436 The enactment of all or most of these concepts into either 
the LCA, the LHOA, or some combined, comprehensive common-
interest statutory framework would provide just the kind of definitive 
set of rules and standards that would provide fairness both to the unit 
or lot owners and the successor declarant, while at the same time 
creating a level of stability and reliability in the Louisiana real estate 
lending market.437 
CONCLUSION 
As American real estate and land-use planning continues to 
gravitate toward common interest communities and highly planned 
developments, the use of CCR declarations to achieve these policy 
goals is all too inevitable.438 Furthermore, on the heels of the Great 
Recession and the economic woes that accompanied the housing 
industry’s crash in 2007 and 2008, lenders are more cautious than ever 
in their support of speculative real estate projects.439 This lender 
hesitation highlights, more so now than ever, the importance of a 
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developer being able to provide strong and dependable collateral to 
entice the lender to advance funds.440 The declaration of CCRs 
represents an important piece of such a collateral package because of 
the many advantages that it bestows on the holder.441 The declarant is 
able to enforce the collection of common assessments that support the 
maintenance of the development and has considerable decision-making 
authority as to the direction and goals of the common interest 
community.442 
But in Louisiana, the decision to take a security interest in such 
collateral is not one that can be easily made by a lender.443 The 
difficulty in making this determination lies in the open question of 
exactly how such incorporeal rights can be effectively collateralized, as 
well as what types of liability the lender will incur as the successor to 
the developer when it becomes the declarant.444 As to the first question, 
Louisiana’s law of security devices seems to require a piecemeal and 
multidimensional approach to taking a security interest in CCRs.445 
Many of the most important and widely used security devices are 
implicated in ultimately confecting such collateral in favor of the 
lender.446 Because the declaration comprises rights that are movable 
and immovable in nature (as well as some rights that are arguably 
mixed), a lender will need to take a mortgage in the various servitudes 
and building restrictions on the land and improvements, as well as a 
UCC article 9 interest in the general intangible movable aspects of the 
declaration. And finally, as a prophylactic measure, the lender should 
obtain a pledge of the “gap” or “in between” aspects of the CCRs.447  
With regard to the lender’s liability as the successor under the 
declaration, the resolution to this issue is even more uncertain.448 The 
laws of many other states provide a body of case law and various 
statutory sources from which this issue can be analyzed.449 However, 
Louisiana lacks such direct, on-point resources for this particular type of 
CCR-related lender liability. One possibility is for the question to be 
analyzed under the framework of the law of assignments and assumption 
because, essentially, the collateralization of the CCRs represents a 
transfer of the rights of the developer as the declarant to a third party (the 
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lender) to secure repayment of the debt.450 On the other hand, one could 
equally argue that because so many of the most salient features of a 
declaration of CCRs comprise building restrictions and limited personal 
servitudes, the issue of successor liability should be governed by that 
particular legal regime.451 And lastly, because the control of the 
association—which governs the common interest community itself—is 
the chief power being conferred by the declaration on the developer, and 
thereby being foreclosed and taken over by the lender, one might assert 
that the established doctrine of successor liability under the corporate 
law system should be dispositive.452  
In the end, each of these lenses through which the issue of the 
successor liability of lenders turned declarants can be viewed provide a 
weak and unclear result.453 The reason for these inadequacies stems 
from the fact that each of these different types of legal regimes are 
distinctly part of the makeup of a common interest community, but it is 
their interplay and ability to connect with each other that gives effect to 
the CCR framework itself and thereby makes the community viable.454 
The way in which the building restrictions and servitudes provide an 
enforcement mechanism for the association, which is funded, in turn, 
by the statutory authority to charge assessments against the lots or 
units, all come together to form the very core of what makes a common 
interest community possible.455 No single aspect operates alone to give 
life to the whole.456 
Therefore, because of the complex and labyrinthine set of rules and 
legal institutions that underlie CCR declarations, it is only logical that 
an equally nuanced and comprehensive statutory construct would be 
needed to address the intricate issues of successor liability for lenders 
turned declarants.457 One such legal construct is the Uniform Common 
Interest Ownership Act, which provides an omnibus statutory 
framework for all common interest communities—whether residential, 
condominium, commercial, or mixed-use—and provides a fair and 
balanced system for the allocation of risks and liabilities between the 
declarant and successors.458 And while it may not be necessary to 
adopt the UCIOA in full, an incorporation of its more useful and wide-
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ranging provisions into Louisiana law would go far in creating a legal 
approach to dealing with both the collateralization and the lender 
liability issues related to CCR declarations.459 
As Louisiana has managed to weather the storms of the housing 
crisis better than many of its sister states, lawmakers must be mindful 
that in order to maintain an active and thriving real estate market, the 
laws governing such transactions must be clear and even-handed.460 In 
doing so, Louisiana should adopt a comprehensive approach to the issue 
described here, which takes into account the rights of the aggrieved lot 
or unit owners such that they would be afforded an avenue of recourse 
for their losses or damages, while at the same time apportioning 
liabilities between the lender and the borrower in a way that provides 
fairness, foreseeability, and the capacity to reasonably assess the risks 
of CCR foreclosure.461  
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